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ARTICLES I
Strip Searches of Public School Students:




"After they're standing in front of me with no clothing, first
they check their head. They bend down and shake their head, go
through their hair with their fingers, check their ears, back and inside
of their ears, check inside the eyelids, on the bottom of the eyelids,
check their nose, inside their mouth, under the tongue, sideways and
the tongue. Then we go down to their armpits and then lift their
breasts up. Then they pull their naval [sic] so I could check and see
there's nothing in there. After that they jump three times on each leg,
squat down three times; and at the end of the third squat, they stay
down and cough. And then they turn around, do the same thing,
jumping three times on each leg, and then they squat down three
times. On the third squat, they stay down. They pull their buttocks
apart and they cough again."'
A strip search is a "visual inspection of an individual's body,
including those portions usually hidden by undergarments."2 While most
*Law Clerk to the Honorable James B. Moran, Chief Judge of the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The author wishes to thank Victor G.
Rosenblum for his valuable comments on an earlier version of this Article.
I. Basurto v. McCarthy, No. Civ. S. 86-1457 EJG (E.D. Cal. filed Dec. 15, 1986) (quoting
the searching officer's description of the search he performed), quoted in Steven F. Shatz et al., The
Strip Search of Children and the Fourth Amendment, 26 U.S.F. L. REv. 1, 1-2 (1991).
2. Shatz et al., supra note 1, at i.
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strip searches are not as invasive as the one described above,3 even
milder strip searches have been characterized as "demeaning,
dehumanizing, undignified, humiliating, terrifying, unpleasant,
embarrassing, [and] repulsive" and "profoundly intrusive event[s]."5
Yet as two cases reported in 1993 indicate,6 public schools continue to
conduct strip searches, and despite the severity of the intrusion involved,
courts often uphold these searches against Fourth Amendment
challenges.'
This Article describes the obstacles students in the public schoolss
currently face in invoking the Fourth Amendment to challenge strip
searches and proposes a new standard for evaluating such challenges.
Part II develops the Fourth Amendment background, focusing especially
on New Jersey v. TL.O.,9 the Supreme Court's only decision applying
the Fourth Amendment to schools. Next, Part III examines two of the
important barriers plaintiffs face in seeking relief for constitutional
violations-the standing requirements and immunity doctrines of 42
U.S.C. § 1983, the statute under which most challenges to strip searches
are brought.'" Part IV discusses the strip search cases decided before
3. Id. at 2 & n.5 (explaining that most school officials will not conduct searches in as thorough
a manner as the one the law enforcement officer performed in Basurto).
4. Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263, 1272 (7th Cir. 1983).
5. In re French, 164 Cal. Rptr. 800, 802 (Ct. App. 1980).
6. Cornfield v. Consolidated High Sch. Dist. No. 230, 991 F.2d 1316 (7th Cir. 1993); State
v. Mark Anthony B., 433 S.E.2d 41 (W. Va. 1993).
7. Since 1985, four strip search cases have been reported. In two of those, the searches were
upheld. Cornfield v. Consolidated High Sch. Dist. No. 230, 991 F.2d 1316 (7th Cir. 1993); Williams
v. Ellington, 936 F.2d 881 (6th Cir. 1991).
8. This Article focuses on strip searches in the elementary and secondary schools, so it does
not address the Fourth Amendment's application to public colleges and universities. This focus
makes sense because all the reported student strip search cases involve elementary and secondary
schools, as does the Supreme Court's decision in New Jersey v. T.L.O., which forms the analytical
basis for the Article. College students are likely to receive greater protection from strip searches than
younger students, if for no other reason than that the state's interest in maintaining order and
discipline in the school (a parent-like role) is much weaker in the college setting. Moreover, college
students are almost always adults, and, although the Court claims that children have the same
constitutional rights as adults, it often shies away from enforcing them as vigorously as it would for
adults. Shatz et al., supra note 1, at 6-7 ("With the exception of Thompson v. Oklahoma, holding
that the death penalty cannot constitutionally be applied to children who murdered before age sixteen,
the Court has never granted children greater constitutional protection than adults. Rather, the Court's
pattern has been to hand down decisions affirming that children enjoy the protection of certain
constitutional rights while, at the same time or subsequently, holding that the constitutional provisions
granting such rights do not apply with the same force to children.") (footnotes omitted).
9. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
10. Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
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and after T.L.O. and sets out the present state of the law on this subject.
Finally, Part V argues that, although the T.L.O. decision and subsequent
Fourth Amendment cases offer little hope that the Supreme Court will
adopt a more restrictive general standard for student searches in the near
future, there are good reasons that tighter controls should be placed on
severe invasions such as strip searches. Part VI concludes that while
student strip searches are alive and well under current Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, they are a relic of less enlightened times and should be
confined to very narrow circumstances.
II. Background: The Fourth Amendment and New Jersey v. T.L. 0.
Although the underlying command of the Fourth Amendment is
always that searches and seizures be reasonable, what is reasonable
depends on the context within which a search takes place. The
determination of the standard of reasonableness governing any specific
class of searches requires "balancing the need to search against the
invasion which the search entails." On one side of the balance are
arrayed the individual's legitimate expectations of privacy and
personal security; on the other, the government's need for effective
methods to deal with breaches of public order."
Although school students might have other protections against strip
searches,' 2 the Fourth Amendment is their most important shield, both
because it is the only legal safeguard that applies to all American
schoolchildren and because its constitutional stature conveys a national
commitment to respect for the individual. This Part examines the Fourth
Amendment standards that apply to public schools. First, section A sets
out the general principles underlying Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
Section B then discusses New Jersey v. T L. 0., the seminal case on the
constitutionality of school searches. Finally, section C examines
developments in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence since TL.O.
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
Laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress
applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of
the District of Columbia.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
II. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985) (citation omitted) (quoting Camara v.
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967)).
12. For example, some courts have invalidated strip searches on state constitutional grounds.
See, e.g., State v. Mark Anthony B., 433 S.E.2d 41 (W. Va. 1993) (holding that strip search was
invalid under both the Fourth Amendment and the West Virginia Constitution).
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A. Fourth Amendment Background
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 3
The amendment was adopted in response to the years of abuses that the
American colonists had suffered at the hands of British officers.'
4
During the pre-Revolutionary period, these officers conducted
"widespread and discretionary searches authorized by writs of
assistance" 5-general warrants that allowed authorities to search nearly
anyone or anything at any time with "neither probable cause nor
particularity of description of persons or premises, nor even judicial
approval prior to the search."' 6 The amendment sought to put an end
to these abuses by sharply curbing the government's power to intrude on
the privacy of individual citizens."
13. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
14. NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 53-55 (1937); Jacob W. Landynski, In Search of Justice Black's
Fourth Amendment, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 453, 462 (1976) [hereinafter Landynski, Justice Black's
Fourth Amendment]; Steven Yarosh, Comment, Operation Clean Sweep: Is the Chicago Housing
Authority 'Sweeping' Away the Fourth Amendment?, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 1103, 1107 & nn.32-34
(1992).
15. Yarosh, supra note 14, at 1107.
16. Landynski, Justice Black's Fourth Amendment, supra note 14, at 462. See also id. (stating
that "[the main object behind the drafting of the amendment was to prevent the recurrence of the
detested general warrant which had been employed by the British in an attempt to stamp out
smuggling in the American colonies") (footnote omitted); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 335
(1985) ("It may well be true that the evil toward which the Fourth Amendment was primarily
directed was the resurrection of the pre-Revolutionary practice of using general warrants or 'writs
of assistance' to authorize searches for contraband by officers of the Crown.").
17. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967) ("Wherever a man may be, he
is entitled to know that he will remain free from unreasonable searches and seizures."); id. at 350
(stating that although "the Fourth Amendment cannot be translated into a general constitutional 'right
to privacy,"' the Amendment does "protect[] individual privacy against certain kinds of governmental
intrusion"); Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987) (stating that the main purpose of the
warrant requirement is to limit government officers' discretion in order to avoid the arbitrary
harassment of citizens); Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979) (holding that a search or seizure
of a person must be "particularized with respect to that person").
For a contrast that strikingly illustrates the constitutional importance of limiting officer
discretion, compare Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (upholding a
sobriety checkpoint that operated under specific, carefully defined guidelines) with Delaware v.
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979) (holding random highway patrol stops unconstitutional because
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As its text indicates, the Fourth Amendment has two basic
commands: (1) that searches and seizures be reasonable and (2) that
search or arrest warrants meet specific requirements. The Reasonableness
Clause's role in proscribing government behavior seems clear enough,
and indeed reasonableness is the basic and essential threshold issue in
every Fourth Amendment case.' 8 The reasonableness of a particular
government action (and therefore its permissibility) is judged by
balancing "'its intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests
against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests.""' 9
The Warrant Clause's role is not easily ascertainable. While it
seems obvious that whenever an officer obtains a warrant, it must meet
the clause's requirements, the clause does not make clear when an officer
is required to obtain a warrant. That is, it is not clear whether a warrant
is required in every case for a search or seizure to be constitutional. The
Supreme Court has taken two basic approaches to this question. The
conventional approach holds that the Warrant Clause in part defines the
Reasonableness Clause; a "'reasonable' [and therefore constitutional]
search is one which meets the warrant requirements specified in the
[Warrant Clause].""0 An alternative approach asserts that the two
clauses are independent of each other, so that whether the Warrant Clause
requirements are met is only one factor to be considered in determining
whether a search or seizure is reasonable.2'
The Supreme Court generally adheres to the first approach. In the
landmark case of Katz v. United States,22 for example, the Court held
that searches and seizures "conducted outside the judicial process, without
prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the
[Fjourth [A]mendment-subject only to a few specifically established and
they permitted "standardless and unconstrained discretion"). See also National Treasury Employees
Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 667 (1989) (upholding administrative blood test for drug use, in
part because the purpose and extent of the intrusion were very narrowly defined); United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 577 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that the warrant
requirement was intended to prevent "[action based merely on whatever may pique the curiosity of
a particular officer").
18. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989) (stating that the
Fourth Amendment "does not proscribe all searches and seizures, but only those that are
unreasonable").
19. Id. (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979)).
20. JACOB W. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT 42-43 (1966)
[hereinafter LANDYNSKi, SEARCH AND SEIZURE]; see also New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 359
(1985) (Brennan and Marshall, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The second Clause
... gives content to the word 'unreasonable' in the first Clause.").
21. Yarosh, supra note 14, at 1109-10; LANDYNSKi, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, supra note 20, at
42-43.
22. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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well-delineated exceptions."23  Later cases have consistently affirmed
Katz.
24
Despite its general predilection for the warrant requirement, the
Supreme Court-as the Katz language suggests-has created a number of
exceptions to the rule, several of which deserve mention here. First, if
an officer is in "hot pursuit" of a suspect or an actual emergency exists,
the exigency exception allows him to search the suspect without a
warrant.25 Second, no warrant is needed if the individual consents to
the search. 26  Third, if the search is incident to arrest-that is, if the
subject of the search has already been arrested-then no warrant is
necessary to search the person and her immediate surroundings.27
Fourth, police officers may conduct brief warrantless searches for
weapons (pat-downs) if they reasonably suspect a person of criminal
activity. 28 Fifth, if engaged in overseeing a tightly regulated industry
such as mining or liquor selling, an officer may search without a warrant
as long as the administrative scheme adequately limits his discretion.29
(This is known as an administrative search.) Finally, some warrantless
searches are permissible simply because the government has a special
need, beyond the normal need for crime control, which the warrant and
probable cause requirements would frustrate.3"
When a case falls under this last exception to the Warrant Clause,
the Court asks only whether the search or seizure was reasonable given
the "totality of the circumstances."'" Therefore, to sustain its action, the
government must show only that its interests in conducting the search or
seizure outweigh the individual's legitimate expectations of privacy.
32
23. Id. at 357.
24. E.g., Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 2135 (1993) (quoting the Katz language);
Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 133 n.4 (1990) (same).
25. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
26. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (stating that "one of the specifically
established exceptions to the requirements of both a warrant and probable cause is a search that is
conducted pursuant to consent").
27. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969) (permitting an arresting officer to search
the person arrested and "the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or
evidentiary items" "in order to remove any weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to resist
arrest or effect his escape" and "in order to prevent [the] concealment or destruction" of evidence).
28. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1967).
29. Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970) (liquor selling); Donovan
v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981) (mining).
30. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
31. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230 (1983).
32. Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91 (1990). In Olson, the Court stated: "Since the decision
in [Katz], it has been the law that 'capacity to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment depends
. ..upon whether the person who claims the protection of the Amendment has a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the invaded place."' Id. at 95 (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143
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This entails showing that the warrantless search or seizure was both
reasonable in its inception and reasonable scope.33
In sum, most searches and seizures are reasonable-and thereore
constitutional-only if the Warrant Clause requirements are met. Yet in
several situations, warrantless searches are permitted. As section B will
demonstrate, searches that take place in the public schools fall into the
second category. More specifically, they come under the special needs
doctrine and therefore are legitimate as long as they are reasonable at
their inception and reasonable in scope.
B. Searches in Public Schools: New Jersey v. T.L.O.
New Jersey v. TL.O.34 was the Supreme Court's first opportunity
to consider what restrictions the Fourth Amendment places on the
conduct of public school officials. This section describes the facts of the
case and discusses the opinions of the Justices.
The defendant in T.L.O. was a fourteen-year-old high school
freshman. She and another girl were caught smoking cigarettes in a
lavatory in violation of school rules. They were taken to the principal's
office and questioned by an assistant vice principal, Theodore Choplick.
T.L.O.'s companion admitted that she had violated the rule, but T.L.O.
denied that she had been smoking in the lavatory and said that she did
not smoke at all.35
Choplick took T.L.O. into his private office and asked to see her
purse. He opened the purse and found a pack of cigarettes inside. He
removed these from the purse and accused T.L.O. of lying to him. In
reaching for the cigarettes, Choplick noticed a package of cigarette rolling
paper, which in his experience was closely associated with marijuana use.
Suspecting that a more extensive inspection might reveal further evidence
of drug use, he searched the purse thoroughly. This time he found "a
small amount of marihuana, a pipe, a number of empty plastic bags, a
substantial quantity of money in one-dollar bills, an index card that
appeared to be a list of students who owed T.L.O. money, and two letters
that implicated T.L.O. in marihuana dealing.
' 36
(1978)). "A subjective expectation of privacy is legitimate if it is '"one that society is prepared to
recognize as 'reasonable."" Id. at 95-96 (quoting Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143-44 n. 12, which in turn was
quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring)).
33. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1967).
34. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
35. Id. at 328.
36. Id.
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Choplick notified T.L.O.'s mother and the police of his discoveries
and turned over the evidence he had found to the police. T.L.O.'s
mother took her to the police station, where T.L.O. confessed to selling
marijuana. Based on this evidence, the State brought charges against
T.L.O. in juvenile court. T.L.O. moved to suppress the evidence that
Choplick had taken from her purse by alleging that the search was
unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment; and, therefore, the
evidence was barred by the "exclusionary rule."" She further argued
that, because her confession was "tainted by the allegedly unlawful
search"' 3s -that is, it was the "fruit of the poisonous tree"39-it too
should be suppressed.4 °
The juvenile court denied T.L.O.'s motion to suppress, and the
Appellate Division "affirmed the trial court's finding that there had been
no Fourth Amendment violation."' The New Jersey Supreme Court
disagreed. It held that, because the possession of cigarettes was not
against school rules, the only possible reason for the search was to
discredit T.L.O.'s claim that she had not been smoking. The court found
this reason insufficient to justify the search. Even if a reasonable
suspicion that T.LO. had the cigarettes would have justified the search,
Choplick had not been told anything that would have raised a reasonable
suspicion of wrongdoing. Moreover, even if Choplick was justified in
searching through the purse, his initial find could not possibly have
37. The exclusionary rule dictates that evidence discovered during an unconstitutional search
is inadmissible. The Supreme Court first announced the exclusionary rule in Weeks v. United States,
232 U.S. 383 (1914). The Court explained:
If letters and private documents can.. . be seized [in violation of the Fourth Amendment]
and held and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of
the Fourth Amendment, declaring his right to be secure against such searches and
seizures, is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be
stricken from the Constitution. The efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the
guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of
those great principles established be years of endeavor and suffering which have resulted
in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land.
Id. at 393. In Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), the Supreme Court held that the exclusionary rule
applied equally to the states: "We hold that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in
violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a state court." Id. at 655.
38. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 329.
39. "This figure of speech is drawn from Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), in
which the Court held that evidence and witnesses discovered as a result of a search in violation of
the Fourth Amendment must be excluded from evidence." Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 305-06
(1985). While the exclusionary rule bars the use of direct products of an illegal search, see supra
note 37 and accompanying text, the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine bars the use of indirect
products of the search, such as confessions. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 306.
40. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 329.
41. Id.
STRIP SEARCHES
warranted his subsequent extensive examination of T.L.O.'s papers and
effects. In light of these arguments, the court held that the search
violated the Fourth Amendment and that the juvenile court should have
granted T.L.O.'s motion to suppress. The State of New Jersey appealed
and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. 2
The first question facing the Court was whether the Fourth
Amendment applied to school officials at all. Some lower courts had
concluded that
school officials are exempt from the dictates of the [amendment] by
virtue of the special nature of their authority over schoolchildren.
Teachers and school administrators, it is said, act in loco parentis in
their dealings with students; their authority is that of the parent, not
the State, and is therefore not subject to the limits of the Fourth
Amendment.43
The Court found this reasoning "in tension with contemporary reality and
the teachings of this Court" and held that the Fourth Amendment
applied to teachers and school administrators just as it does to other
government officials.45
Having concluded that the Fourth Amendment applied, the T.L.O.
Court considered what standard should govern searches of schoolchildren.
"Although the underlying command of the [amendment] is always that
searches and seizures be reasonable," it said, "what is reasonable depends
on the context within which a search takes place."' 6 The need for the
search must always be balanced against the invasion contemplated. "On
one side of [that] balance are arrayed the individual's legitimate
expectations of privacy and personal security; on the other, the
42. Id. at 331.
43. Id. at 336 (citation omitted). As an example of some courts' willingness to invoke the in
loco parentis rationale, the Supreme Court cited R.C.M. v. State, 660 S.W.2d 552 (Tex. Ct. App.
1983). T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 336. In contrast, the New Jersey Supreme Court had held'in T.L.O. itself
that the Fourth Amendment applied to searches by school officials. Id. at 330; see also State ex rel.
T.L.O., 463 A.2d 934 (N.J. 1983).
44. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 336.
45. Id. The Court noted that it had already applied the Fourth Amendment to the activities of
building inspectors, Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967); Occupational Safety and
Health Act inspectors, Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312-13 (1978); and firemen entering
private property to fight a fire, Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 506 (1978). T.L.O., 469 U.S. at
335. Since T.L.O., the Court has held that the Fourth Amendment applies to searches of government
employees' offices by workplace supervisors, O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 715 (1987), and
to workplace testing of urine samples for drugs, Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489
U.S. 602, 617 (1989).
46. TL.O., 469 U.S. at 337.
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government's need for effective methods to deal with breaches of public
order." 7
The Court began its balancing inquiry by evaluating the nature of
school students' privacy interest. It said that the type of invasion of
privacy that occurred in TL.O.-a limited personal search-would be "a
substantial invasion of privacy ' in other contexts and that it should
also be seen as such in the school context. The Court dismissed the
state's argument that students have no legitimate expectations of privacy
because it rested on two "severely flawed" premises: that privacy is
fundamentally incompatible with the educational environment and that
children have a minimal interest in the personal items they bring to
school.49 Rather, it concluded that "schoolchildren may find it necessary
to carry with them a variety of legitimate, noncontraband items, and there
is no reason to conclude that they have necessarily waived all rights to
privacy in such items merely by bringing them onto school grounds."5
There was no dissent among the Justices on this point.
The Court then turned to the other side of the balance: the
government's interest in dealing effectively with breaches of the public
order. All nine Justices agreed that the state had a strong interest in
"maintaining discipline in the classroom and on school grounds."'" All
also agreed that this need for close supervision justified bypassing the
warrant requirement; requiring teachers and administrators to obtain a
warrant every time they needed to search a student would place an
excessive burden on the educational system.52 In other words, the Court
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 338.
50. Id. at 339.
51. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 339; id. at 350 (Powell and O'Connor, JJ., concurring) (emphasizing
the state's "compelling interest in assuring that the schools meet [their] responsibility" of educating
and training children); i. at 353 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (recognizing government's "special
need" to closely oversee the school environment); i. at 357 (Brennan and Marshall, JJ., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (acknowledging that "extraordinary governmental interests do exist"
in the school context); id. at 376 (Stevens, Brennan, and Marshall, JJ., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (accepting "'the substantial need of teachers and administrators for freedom to
maintain order in the schools"') (quoting the majority opinion, T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341).
52. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340-41 (1985); id. at 350 (Powell and O'Connor, JJ., concurring) ("it
would be unreasonable and at odds with history to argue that the full panoply of constitutional rules
applies with the same force and effect in the schoolhouse as it does in the enforcement of criminal
laws"); id. at 353 (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment) ("the special need [for order in the school
setting] justifies the Court in excepting school searches from the warrant and probable-cause
requirement"); id at 357 (Brennan and Marshall, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(governmental interests in the school setting "are sufficient to justify an exception to the warrant
requirement"); id. at 376 (Stevens, Brennan, and Marshall, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) ("warrantless searches of students by school administrators are reasonable when undertaken"
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held that searches in the schools fall under the "special needs doctrine,"
an exception to the Warrant Clause that permits searches without a
warrant where "special needs, beyond the normal need for law
enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement
impracticable." '53 When the special needs doctrine applies, the court
engages in a balancing of interests independent of the warrant
requirement. For a search to be upheld under the doctrine, three
conditions must be met: (1) there must be an important governmental
interest other than the usual interest in crime control; (2) it must be the
case that requiring a warrant and probable cause would be impractical
and would frustrate the purpose behind the search; and (3) the search
must be reasonable in light of the governmental interest.54 Although not
all explicitly said so, all the Justices seemed to agree that the special
needs doctrine applied to the facts of T.L.O.55
For the most part, then, the Justices agreed that schoolchildren have
a significant interest in protecting their privacy, and that the state has an
interest in maintaining order and discipline which is strong enough to
justify warrantless searches. But they differed over how to strike the
balance between these two interests.
The majority opinion, which remains the controlling precedent in all
student search cases, held that "the legality of a search of a student
should depend simply on the reasonableness, under all the circumstances,
of the search." '56 The Court prescribed a two-part inquiry. First, one
must consider "whether the . . . action was justified at its inception."
Second, one must determine whether the search as actually conducted
"was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the
interference in the first place."57 The Court continued:
to promptly and effectively respond to an "explosive atmosphere").
53. TL.O., 469 U.S. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment).
54. Id. See also Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 622 (1989)
(applying the same standard); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. i, 20 (1967) (applying a similar standard).
55. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 337 (adopting the special needs balancing framework); id. at 349-50
(Powell and O'Connor, JJ., concurring) (recognizing that teachers are not subject to the same
constitutional restraints that law enforcement officers face); id. at 353 (Blackmun, J., concurring in
judgment) ("the special need [for order in the school setting) justifies the Court in excepting school
searches from the warrant and probable-cause requirement"); id. at 356 (Brennan and Marshall, JJ.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (accepting the doctrine but arguing that the government's
interest was not sufficient to invoke the balancing analysis); id. at 376-77 (Stevens, Brennan, and
Marshall, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (supporting a balancing test, but arguing that
the majority improperly evaluated the reasonableness of the search).
56. TL.O., 469 U.S. at 341.
57. Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. i, 20 (1967)) (citation omitted).
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[A] search of a student by a teacher or other school official will be
"justified at its inception" when there are reasonable grounds for
suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the student has
violated or is violating either the law or the rules of the school. Such
a search will be permissible in its scope when the measures adopted
are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not
excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the
nature of the infraction.58
Having set out this standard for student searches, the Court applied
its rule to the facts of the case before it. It concluded that the search of
T.L.O.'s purse was reasonable at its inception because, although
possession of cigarettes did not violate school rules, smoking did, and
T.L.O. had denied that she smoked at all. Evidence that she possessed
cigarettes was therefore relevant to the charges of smoking because it
"would both corroborate the report that she had been smoking and
undermine the credibility of her defense [that she did not smoke]."59 So
as long as Choplick "had a reasonable suspicion that T.L.O. had
cigarettes in her purse, the search was justified despite the fact that the
cigarettes, if found, would constitute 'mere evidence' of a violation."6
While the New Jersey Supreme Court had held that Choplick could not
have had a reasonable suspicion that T.L.O.'s purse would contain
cigarettes, the Supreme Court found it perfectly sensible to assume that,
if T.L.O. had been smoking, she might still have the cigarettes with her,
and the most logical place to keep them would have been her purse.
Noting that "'sufficient probability, not certainty, is the touchstone of
reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment,"'' the Court held that "it
cannot be said that Mr. Choplick acted unreasonably when he examined
T.L.O.'s purse to see if it contained cigarettes." '62 In other words, the
search was reasonable at its inception.
The search was also reasonable in scope, said the Court. The first
search for the cigarettes was reasonable because "if [T.L.O.] did have the
cigarettes [which she denied], her purse was the obvious place in which
to find them."63 The second search was reasonable because, having seen
the rolling papers in the purse, Choplick had reasonable cause to suspect
that T.L.O. might be carrying marijuana. Therefore he was justified in
58. Id. at 341-42.
59. Id. at 345.
60. Id. (quoting Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 307 (1967)).




extending his search to other areas of the purse. And when he found the
card with names of people to whom T.L.O. owed money, "the inference
that T.L.O. was involved in marihuana trafficking was substantial enough
to justify Mr. Choplick in examining the letters to determine whether they
contained any further evidence. ''" Since the search satisfied both
prongs of the reasonableness inquiry, the Court upheld its
constitutionality. Since teachers have a substantial need "for freedom to
maintain order in the schools," 5 probable cause was not required. The
Court declined to resolve the issue of whether individualized suspicion
remains a requirement for a student search.66
In addition to the majority opinion, which continues to govern the
Fourth Amendment's application to the schools,67 there were four
separate opinions filed in TL.O.6" As noted above,69 each opinion
struck its own balance between the privacy rights of students and the
institutional needs of school authorities. The two concurrences diverged
only slightly from the majority opinion. Justice Powell merely placed
more emphasis on the interests of the elementary and secondary schools
"that make it unnecessary to afford students the same constitutional
protections granted adults and juveniles in a nonschool setting.
7 °
Justice Blackmun, concurring only in the judgment, scolded the majority
for taking a slightly overbroad approach in its "implication that the
balancing test [of the special needs doctrine] is the rule rather than the
64. Id. at 347.
65. Id. at 341.
66. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342 n.8. The Court stated:
We do not decide whether individualized suspicion is an essential requirement of the
reasonableness standard we adopt for searches by school authorities. In other contexts,
however, we have held that although "some quantum of individualized suspicion is
usually a prerequisite to a constitutional search or seizure[,] ...the Fourth Amendment
imposes no irreducible requirement of such suspicion." Exceptions to the requirement of
individualized suspicion are generally appropriate only where the privacy interests
implicated by a search are minimal and where "other safeguards" are available "to ensure
that the individual's reasonable expectation of privacy of privacy is not 'subject to the
discretion of the official in the field.'"
Id. (citations mitted) (quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560-61 (1976);
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654-55 (1979)).
67. See infra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
68. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 348-50 (Powell and O'Connor, JJ., concurring); id. at 351-53
(Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 353-70 (Brennan and Marshall, JJ., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); id. at 370-86 (Stevens, Brennan, and Marshall, JJ., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
69. See supra text preceding note 56.
70. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 348 (Powell and O'Connor, JJ., concurring).
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exception" in Fourth Amendment cases, but otherwise went along with
the Court."'
Justice Brennan's and Justice Stevens's opinions were much less
tolerant of the majority's approach. Justice Brennan's main point was
that, although it is unreasonable to require a warrant in the school setting,
the probable cause requirement should still be observed. He correctly
noted that "[a]n unbroken line of cases in this Court have held that
probable cause is a prerequisite for a full-scale search."7 2  Since
Choplick's "thorough excavation"73 of T.L.O.'s purse was clearly a
full-scale search (not something lesser like a pat-down search74),
Brennan argued that the probable cause standard should apply. Brennan
would have held that Choplick's initial search for cigarettes was
reasonable, but that his subsequent search for marijuana was not
supported by probable cause. "The mere presence without more of such
a staple item of commerce [as cigarette rolling papers] is insufficient to
warrant a person of reasonable caution in inferring both that T.L.O. had
violated the law by possessing marihuana and that evidence of that
violation would be found in her purse."75  The majority's use of a
balancing test "to determine the standard for evaluating the validity of a
full-scale search represents a sizable innovation in Fourth Amendment
analysis"-one that "finds support neither in precedent nor policy and
portends a dangerous weakening of the purpose of the Fourth Amendment
to protect the privacy and security of our citizens."76 The Constitution,
Brennan argued, mandates the probable cause standard unless "the
intrusion is much less severe [than a full-scale search] and the need for
greater authority compelling";7 the Court does not have the authority
"to answer all Fourth Amendment questions by consulting its momentary
vision of the social good.78
Justice Stevens, concurring in part and dissenting in part, struck a
somewhat different chord in his criticisms of the Court's decision. First,
he argued that the Court should have decided the exclusionary rule
question, which had been the basis for the grant of certiorari but which
71. Id. at 352 (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment).
72. Id. at 358 (Brennan and Marshall, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
73. Id. at 355 (Brennan and Marshall, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
74. The Court had allowed searches based on less than probable cause for brief pat-down
searches by police to check for weapons. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1967).
75. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 368-69 (Brennan and Marshall, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
76. Id. at 358 (Brennan and Marshall, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
77. Id. at 367 (Brennan and Marshall, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
78. Id. at 370 (Brennan and Marshall, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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the Court in afootnote decided not to decide. Stevens argued that the
exclusionary rule should apply to all searches that violate constitutional
rights, regardless of which government official conducts them.79
Emphasizing the importance of teachers and school administrators as role
models to our youth, he said:
If the Nation's students can be convicted through the use of arbitrary
methods destructive of personal liberty, they cannot help but feel that
they have been dealt with unfairly. The application of the
exclusionary rule in criminal proceedings arising from illegal school
searches makes an important statement to young people that "our
society attaches serious consequences to a violation of constitutional
rights," and that this is a principle of "liberty and justice for all.""0
In addition to his exclusionary rule criticism, Stevens argued that,
because the Court set forth a standard that treats all violations of school
rules similarly, it would "permit school administrators to search students
suspected of violating only the most trivial school regulations and
guidelines for behavior."'" To borrow Stevens's illustration, under the
majority's standard, searches for evidence of a dress code violation would
be governed by the same standard as searches for evidence of a narcotics
violation."2  Stevens conceded that the Court's standard, at least in
theory, accounted for "the nature of the infraction,"83 but he argued that
in practice this requirement would be overlooked. "The Court's effort to
establish a standard that is, at once, clear enough to allow searches to be
upheld in nearly every case, and flexible enough to prohibit obviously
unreasonable intrusions of young adults' privacy only creates uncertainty
in the extent of its resolve to prohibit the latter."8 4 In support of his
claim, Stevens pointed to the TL.O. decision itself: "[T]he majority's
application of its standard in this case-to permit a male administrator to
rummage through the purse of a female high school student in order to
obtain evidence that she was smoking in a bathroom-raises grave doubts
in my mind whether its effort will be effective."8" Unlike the Court,
79. Id. at 372 (Stevens, Marshall, and Brennan, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
80. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 374 (Stevens, Marshall, and Brennan, JJ., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 492 (1976) and 36
U.S.C. § 172 (1982) (pledge of allegiance to the flag)).
81. Id. at 371 (Stevens, Marshall, and Brennan, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
82. Id. at 377 (Stevens, Marshall, and Brennan, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
83. Id. at 342 (opinion of the Court). See supra text accompanying note 58 for the full text of
the majority's standard.
84. TL.O., 469 U.S. at 381 (Stevens, Marshall, and Brennan, JJ., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
85. Id. at 381-82 (Stevens, Marshall, and Brennan, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in
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Stevens asserted that "the nature of the suspected infraction is a matter
of first importance in deciding whether any invasion of privacy is
permissible."86 In place of the Court's overly permissive standard, he
proposed a rule that "would permit teachers and school administrators to
search a student [only] when they have reason to believe that the search
will uncover evidence that the student is violating the law or engaging in
conduct that is seriously disruptive of school order, or the educational
process. 87
Despite these powerful voices in dissent, there was little doubt about
the rule that the T.L.O. decision set forth. Searches of public school
students by teachers and school administrators may be conducted without
a warrant and do not require probable cause. Searches must be based on
a reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing and must be reasonable in their
inception and in their scope-that is, "not excessively intrusive in light
of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction.""8
C. Developments Since T.L.O.
In the nine years that have passed since T.L.O., the Supreme Court
has not revisited the issue of the Fourth Amendment's application to
school officials. Lower court decisions indicate that T.L.O. continues to
govern the Fourth Amendment's application to the public schools. In the
all of the reported student strip search cases since 1985, for example, the
courts have acknowledged that the T.L.O. standard governs and have
applied it to the facts before them.89 As the Sixth Circuit stated in
Williams v. Ellington,9" "New Jersey v. T.L.0. . . . remains the
preeminent Supreme Court case discussing Fourth Amendment rights of
school students within the confines of the educational environment." 9,
Moreover, developments in other areas of the Supreme Court's
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence reveal that the fundamental reasoning
of T.L.O. remains intact. As Justice Brennan noted in his opinion, T.L.O.
was the first Supreme Court case to uphold an invasive search undertaken
without a warrant supported by probable cause, and to install a balancing
part).
86. Id. at 382 (Stevens, Marshall, and Brennan, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
87. Id. at 378 (Stevens, Marshall, and Brennan, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
88. Id. at 342 (opinion of the Court).
89. See Cornfield v. Consolidated High Sch. Dist. No. 230, 991 F.2d 1316 (7th Cir. 1993);
Williams v. Ellington, 936 F.2d 881 (6th Cir. 1991); Burnham v. West, 681 F. Supp. 1160 (E.D. Va.
1987); Cales v. Howell Pub. Schs., 635 F. Supp. 454 (E.D. Mich. 1985); State v. Mark Anthony B.,
433 S.E.2d 41 (W. Va. 1993).
90. 936 F.2d 881 (6th Cir. 1991).
91. Id. at 886.
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test in its place.9" Since T.L.O., several decisions have continued this
use of balancing tests to evaluate Fourth Amendment issues. For
example, in the 1987 case of Griffin v. Wisconsin,93 the Court upheld a
warrantless search of a probationer's home. Although the Court had long
held that "expectations of privacy are greatest within an individual's own
home,"94 in Griffin it applied a balancing test much like that used in
T.L.O., holding that the state's probation system presented special
governmental needs beyond the normal need for law enforcement that
made the warrant and probable cause requirements impracticable despite
the considerable intrusion involved.95  In 1989, the Court decided
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n96 and National Treasury
Employees Union v. Von Raab,97 both of which upheld drug testing of
government employees conducted without a warrant or probable cause.98
The Von Raab Court went especially far, using a balancing test to uphold
a search that was conducted without individualized suspicion and
involved a considerable intrusion on those searched-two requirements
that similar searches had been forced to meet in prior cases. 99 Decisions
92. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 358-62 (Brennan and Marshall, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (thoroughly examining the Court's Fourth Amendment cases and finding none in which
probable cause was not required for a full-scale search like the one upheld in TL.O.).
93. 483 U.S. 868 (1987).
94. Yarosh, supra note 14, at 1124. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589(1980) ("The
[F]ourth [Ajmendment protects the individual's privacy in a variety of settings. In none is the zone
of privacy more clearly defined than when bounded by the unambiguous physical dimensions of an
individual's home ...."); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) (stating that at the
core of the Fourth Amendment is "the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free
from unreasonable governmental intrusion").
95. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 876 ("ITihe special needs of Wisconsin's probation system make the
warrant requirement impracticable .... A warrant requirement would interfere to an appreciable
degree with the probation system ... .
96. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
97. 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
98. At least one article has characterized Skinner and Von Raab as administrative search cases.
Supreme Court-Leading Cases, 103 HARV. L. REV. 137, 269 (1989). Seen in this way, the cases
might seem inapposite to any discussion of T.L.O.'s vitality. But not only did the majority opinion
in Von Raab note that the drug-testing program served "special governmental needs," 489 U.S. at
665, which would seem to suggest that the case falls within the special needs doctrine, but the same
article acknowledged that the cases and particularly Von Raab go far beyond the "very narrow set
of circumstances," Supreme Court--Leading Cases, supra, at 275, to which administrative search
doctrine had previously applied, blurring the lines between that doctrine and the rest of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. Id. at 278-79. Moreover, T.L.O. itself has been called an administrative
search case. Franz v. Lytle, 997 F.2d 784, 789 (10th Cir. 1993). Since any expansion of the kind
of balancing doctrine used in T.L.O. tends to extend rather than limit the force of T.L.O.'s authority,
whether one calls the cases in which the expansion takes place administrative search cases or special
needs cases is largely irrelevant.
99. The Court downplayed the intrusiveness of the search by emphasizing the importance of the
governmental interest served, arguing essentially that those tested "had diminished expectations of
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like Griffin and Von Raab do not directly extend TL.O., but they clearly
carry on its reasoning and underlying spirit. T.L.O. remains the
controlling authority on searches of students in the public schools.
I1. Section 1983: A Formidable Hurdle for Strip Search Victims
[A] municipality may not be held liable under § 1983 based on a
theory of respondeat superior; instead, a government is responsible
under § 1983 only "when execution of a government's policy or
custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or
acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the
injury ....
[G]overnment officials performing discretionary functions
generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'0 '
Fourth Amendment challenges to school searches fall into two
general categories: exclusionary rule cases and section 1983 cases.
Challenges of the first type arise when the subject of the search is
prosecuted based on evidence recovered during the search and invokes the
"exclusionary rule," which dictates that evidence discovered during an
unconstitutional search is inadmissible." 2 Because the exclusionary
rule by nature applies only to the particular factual situation before the
court, it is of little help to students seeking general relief from
searches.'0 3 And because it is a defense, the rule cannot be the basis
for compensating the victims of unconstitutional searches.
Fourth Amendment challenges under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 do not suffer
these disadvantages. Adopted as part of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871,
section 1983 provides that anyone who, "under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the
privacy because they knew that their fitness for the job 'depend[ed] uniquely on their judgment and
dexterity."' Supreme Court-Leading Cases, supra note 98, at 272-73 (quoting Von Raab, 489 U.S.
at 672).
100. Williams v. Ellington, 936 F.2d 881, 884 (6th Cir. 1991) (citation omitted) (quoting Monell
v. Department of Social Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)).
101. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
102. See supra note 37 and accompanying text (discussing the origins and meaning of the
exclusionary rule). An example of a case in which a student invoked the exclusionary rule to
challenge the constitutionality of a strip search is State v. Mark Anthony B., 433 S.E.2d 41 (W. Va.
1993).
103. One exception to this generalization may be that exclusionary rule cases can establish the
constitutionality of particular searches, and these decisions can then be relied on to overcome
immunity barriers in later section 1983 cases. See the discussion infra section A.
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District of Columbia," deprives another "of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and Laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress."'O' Despite its broad language and provision for
affirmative relief through an award of damages or an injunction, however,
section 1983 has its own limitations. This Part describes the hurdles that
confront plaintiffs seeking relief under section 1983.
For many years after section 1983 was adopted, plaintiffs could
obtain relief only if the action alleged to violate their constitutional rights
was undertaken pursuant to established law, custom, or practice. Of
course, this "official violations" rule left many of the most egregious
violations unredressed, since "the vast majority of civil rights violations
are caused by officers or officials who act contrary not only to the
Constitution, but to official policy."' 5
In its 1961 decision in Monroe v. Pape,"° the Supreme Court
departed from the official violations rule, construing section 1983's
"under color of state law" language to include actions by government
officials undertaken without authorization or approval as well as official
violations.' 7 In so holding, the Monroe Court opened the door to
considerable section 1983 litigation. Over the succeeding years, the
Court continually expanded the statute's coverage by removing both
procedural and substantive barriers. It read the state action requirement
broadly, held that the section protected property as well as liberty
interests, and rejected the argument that plaintiffs must exhaust state
remedies before invoking section 1983. Section 1983 cases were brought
more frequently.' 8 "As the number of cases . . . continued to grow,
however, so did the arguments for finding some means of limiting access
to the federal courts for what some viewed as 'insignificant' or merely
state law tort cases."' 9 Gradually, the Supreme Court began to impose
hurdles to section 1983 actions, hurdles that today pose significant
problems for section 1983 plaintiffs. Section A below examines the
104. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). Section 1983 does not create any substantive rights; it merely
provides a civil cause of action against an individual who, acting under color of state law, violates
federal rights. Allen v. Board of Comm'rs of County of Wyandotte, 773 F. Supp. 1442, 1447 (D.
Kan. 1991). The full text of§ 1983 is reproduced supra at note 10.
105. David Rudovsky, The Qualified Immunity Doctrine in the Supreme Court: JudicialActivism
and the Restriction of Constitutional Rights, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 23, 28 (1989).
106. 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled inpart, Monell v. Department of Social Servs. of N.Y., 436
U.S. 658 (1978).
107. Id. at 183-85.
108. Rudovsky, supra note 105, at 24.
109. Id. at 30.
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obstacles now facing plaintiffs seeking damages; section B discusses the
obstacles to those seeking injunctions.
A. Obstacles to Claims for Damages: The Immunity Doctrines
Plaintiffs seeking damages under section 1983 face a number of
immunity doctrines that protect governments and government actors from
liability. Governmental immunity is an ancient concept that originated
in England long before the Constitution was adopted."' The modern
immunity doctrine derives some of its authority from these common-law
roots, but it also has constitutional and statutory bases."' Several types
of immunity are currently recognized. The federal government and the
states enjoy absolute immunity from suit (though they may consent to be
sued" 2 ). Municipalities are immune from suit in some circumstances.
Finally, individual government officials receive either absolute or
qualified immunity, depending on the role they are playing.
For school search purposes, the most significant forms of immunity
are municipal and individual immunity. The importance of individual
immunity is obvious: student plaintiffs will want to be able to impose
liability on government officials for their individual behavior. Municipal
immunity is important because for purposes of section 1983,
municipalities include school boards, which employ the teachers and
administrators who conduct student searches." 3 They may be liable in
their own right or on behalf of individuals sued in their official
capacities. The following subsections discuss the development and
current status of individual and municipal immunity.
1. Individual Immunity.-Because school officials-unlike the
President, judges, prosecutors, and legislators' 4---do not receive
absolute individual immunity, they enjoy only qualified immunity."'
110. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 751, 1396 (6th ed. 1990).
III. Rudovsky, supra note 105, at 35 (stating that state immunity is based on the Eleventh
Amendment, presidential immunity on the separation of powers principle, municipal immunity on
statutory interpretation of § 1983, and individual immunity on a combination of all three elements).
112. See supra note 110.
113. See, e.g., Williams v. Ellington, 936 F.2d 881,883-85 (6th Cir. 1991) (applying municipal
immunity doctrine to a case involving a school board). But see Board of Trustees of Hamilton
Heights Sch. Corp. v. Landry, 622 N.E.2d 1019, 1025 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that under
Indiana law, school corporation was an arm of the state and therefore could not be considered a local
government unit subject to suit under § 1983).
114. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982) (President); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349
(1978) (judges); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (prosecutors); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341
U.S. 367 (1951) (legislators).
115. E.g., Williams v. Ellington, 936 F.2d 881, 886 (6th Cir. 1991) (granting school officials
qualified immunity).
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The qualified immunity doctrine is not a creature of statute or a
constitutional rule. It is a judicial construct "defined primarily by the
[Supreme] Court's own policy judgment that an individual's right to
compensation for constitutional violations and the deterrence of
unconstitutional conduct should be subordinated to the governmental
interest in effective and vigorous execution of governmental policies and
programs.""t 
6
The Supreme Court first seriously considered the idea of qualified
immunity in Scheuer v. Rhodes."' Scheuer was a section 1983
damages case in which the plaintiffs sued the governor of Ohio and other
high-ranking state officials for causing the deaths of student
demonstrators shot by the Ohio National Guard at Kent State University
in the spring of 1970. I"' The Court rejected the officials' claim of
absolute executive immunity, but held that "a qualified immunity is
available to officers of the executive branch of government, the variation
being dependent upon the scope of discretion and responsibilities of the
office and all the circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the time
of the action on which liability is sought to be based.""' 9
The Supreme Court's next major qualified immunity case was Wood
v. Strickland,2' which involved the due process rights of students in
school expulsion proceedings. The Court, refining the standard set out
in Scheuer, held that, while common-law principles provided school
board members with qualified immunity,' 2 '
a school board member is not immune from liability for damages
under § 1983 if he knew or reasonably should have known that the
action he took within his sphere of official responsibility would
violate the constitutional rights of the student affected, or if he took
the action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of
constitutional rights or other injury to the student.'22
In other words, Wood established that an official would be immune from
liability unless he acted in violation of constitutional rights of which he
should have known (the objective component) or acted with malice (the
subjective component).
116. Rudovsky, supra note 105, at 36.
117. 416 U.S. 232 (1974), modified, Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
118. Id. at 235.
119. Id. at 247.
120. 420 U.S. 308 (1975), modified, Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
121. Id. at 320.
122. Id. at 322.
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The current qualified immunity doctrine has its roots in the Supreme
Court's next major decision on the subject, Harlow v. Fitzgerald.'23 In
Harlow, the Court "reconsidered and radically reformulated the immunity
doctrine."' 2 4  Noting the time- and resource-intensive aspects of
resolving claims made under the subjective component of the Wood test
(since these claims presented state-of-mind issues that could not be
resolved through summary judgment),'25 the Harlow Court reduced the
test to its objective prong only. The Court concluded: "We therefore
hold that government officials ... generally are shielded from liability
for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known."' 26
The final piece in the qualified immunity puzzle is Anderson v.
Creighton. 2 ' In Anderson, the Court considered a warrantless search
of plaintiffs' home for a fugitive suspected of committing a bank robbery.
The FBI agents who had conducted the search asserted that they had
information that the fugitive was in the plaintiffs' home, that his car
matched the plaintiffs', and that they believed he was likely to be armed
and dangerous. Plaintiffs disputed these contentions and argued that the
Fourth Amendment doctrine clearly established that their home could be
searched for a fugitive only if the agents had probable cause to believe
that the suspect was on the premises and if exigent circumstances
suspended warrant requirement. The government conceded this argument,
but defended that the agents were entitled to immunity unless they
reasonably should have known that their particular conduct violated the
Constitution.'2
In upholding the search, the Court revisited (and revised) its decision
in Harlow. Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia argued that under the
Harlow rule, plaintiffs could "convert the rule of qualified immunity that
our cases plainly establish into a rule of virtually unqualified liability
simply by alleging violation of extremely abstract rights" such as the
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.'29 No one
would argue that such broad abstract rights are not "clearly established,"
so immunity would effectively vanish. In other words, "[t]he operation
of [the Harlow] standard ...depends substantially upon the level of
123. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
124. Rudovsky, supra note 105, at 42.
125. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815-16.
126. Id. at 818 (emphasis added).
127. 483 U.S. 635 (1987).
128. Rudovsky, supra note 105, at 47-48.
129. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639.
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generality at which the relevant 'legal rule' is to be identified." To avoid
this problem, the Anderson Court added a second level of protection for
government officials, granting them immunity as long as they "reasonably
should have known at the time of the incident that [their] particular
conduct violated the Constitution" 3 ':
[TJhe right the official is alleged to have violated must have been
"clearly established" in a more particularized, and hence more
relevant, sense: The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear
that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing
violates that right. This is not to say that an official action is
protected by qualified immunity unless the very action in question has
previously been held unlawful, but it is to say that in the light of
pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent. 3'
Anderson itself indicates how the inquiry should now proceed. The Court
held that whether "the right to be free from warrantless searches of one's
home unless the searching officers have probable cause and there are
exigent circumstances" '132 was clearly established was not the issue (as
it would have been under Harlow). Rather, the trial court should resolve
"the objective (albeit fact-specific) question whether a reasonable officer
could have believed [this FBI agent's] warrantless search to be lawful, in
light of clearly established law and the information the searching officers
possessed."' 33
Anderson makes it much easier for government officials to avoid
liability. Not only do plaintiffs have to allege a more "particularized"
right than under Harlow, but they also have to prove that it was
unreasonable for the alleged violator not to know of the right. Moreover,
as a practical matter, the Anderson rule gives government officials two
bites at the apple in Fourth Amendment cases. If their search was
reasonable under the amendment, they of course escape liability. But
even if it is not reasonable, officials may escape liability if they can show
that a reasonable official could have believed the search was lawful. One
commentator notes the absurdity of this result: "The notion that one can
reasonably and in good faith act in an objectively unreasonable manner
is more than a semantic contradiction."'' 4 In other words, if an officer
acts in violation of the Fourth Amendment-that is, unreasonably-it
does not make sense to turn around and claim that he nonetheless acted
130. Rudovsky, supra note 105, at 48 (emphasis added).
131. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640 (citation omitted).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 641.
134. Rudovsky, supra note 105, at 50-5 1.
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reasonably because his conduct was not clearly prohibited. Yet that is the
law after Anderson. Thus, although Anderson raises the immunity hurdle
for all section 1983 claims against individual officials, it is especially
problematic for Fourth Amendment plaintiffs.
2. Municipal Immunity.-The seminal case on municipal immunity
is Monell v. Department of Social Services of New York. 35 In Monell,
the Court overruled its holding in Monroe v. Pape that "local
governments are wholly immune from suit under § 1983. ' 'I36 Instead,
it held that "Congress did intend municipalities and other local
government units to be included among those persons to whom § 1983
applies.' 37  Even as Monell opened the door to suits against
municipalities, however, it limited recovery to cases in which "the action
that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy
statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and
promulgated by that body's officers.' 38  It is not enough that the
government actor is an employee of the municipality; the municipality's
policy must be the "moving force" that causes the actor to commit the
alleged violation.
139
Subsequent Court decisions applying Monell reveal that this standard
bars recovery in a great number of cases. In Oklahoma City v.
Tuttle, 4' for example, a man was shot and killed by a police officer
who was using excessive force to apprehend him. The man's widow
sued the city under section 1983, alleging that its "policy" of inadequate
police training caused the death. The Court held that because there was
no proof of any action taken by municipal policymakers that could have
caused the officer's conduct, the city could not be held liable; to impose
liability in circumstances where "no wrong could be ascribed to
municipal decisionmakers ... would be to impose it simply because the
municipality hired one 'bad apple."""'
More recent decisions have clarified and perhaps even broadened the
scope of municipal immunity established in Monell. In City of St. Louis
v. Praprotnik, 42 the Court more clearly defined "official policy." In
135. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
136. Id. at 663.
137. ld. at 690.
138. Id. at 690 (citation omitted).
139. Id. at 694. See also City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989) ("[Olur first
inquiry in any case alleging municipal liability under § 1983 is the question whether there is a direct
causal link between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation.").
140. 471 U.S. 808 (1985).
141. Id. at 821.
142. 485 U.S. 112 (1988).
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Praprotnik, a city employee had been laid off after fifteen years' service.
He sued the city under section 1983, alleging that he was laid off in
retaliation for appealing an earlier suspension and that this action violated
his First Amendment and due process rights. 43 The Court held that,
because the employee had not shown that he was laid off pursuant to a
municipal policy, the city was entitled to municipal immunity. In its
opinion, the PraprotnikCourt recognized that "the definition of municipal
liability manifestly needs clarification,' ' 4 4 particularly because Monell
did not explain what it meant to have an "official policy." The Court set
out two requirements that a policy must meet to qualify as official. First,
"only those municipal officials who have 'final policymaking authority'
[as defined by state law] may by their actions subject the government to
§ 1983 liability.' ' 4  Second, "the challenged action must have been
taken pursuant to a policy adopted by the official or officials responsible
under state law for making policy in that area of the city's business."146
Praprotnik's somewhat narrow reading of "policy" to cover only actions
sanctioned by the person responsible for that area of city government
reduces section 1983 plaintiffs' chances of success in suits against
municipalities.
If Praprotnik expanded municipal immunity beyond the bounds of
Monell, City of Canton v. Harris147 went even further. In Canton, the
Court addressed a case in which a municipality was charged with failing
to act in a particular situation. The Court required plaintiffs to meet a
high standard of proof, holding that "the inadequacy of [a city's] police
training may serve as the basis for § 1983 liability only where the failure
to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with
whom the police come into contact."'4 8
Monell and its progeny reveal that a plaintiff's section 1983 claim
will not survive the municipal immunity defense unless he can show that
a strip search was undertaken pursuant to an official policy promulgated
by a responsible official or officials or that the school board was
deliberately indifferent to students' needs. In many cases, this standard
will not be met because there will be no established policy or because the
individual conducting the search will not be implementing an official
143. Id. at 113-16.
144. Id. at 121.
145. Id. at 123 (quoting Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483 (1986)).
146. Id.
147. 489 U.S. 378 (1989).
148. Id. at 388 (emphasis added).
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school board policy. Municipal immunity, like individual immunity, is
difficult for plaintiffs seeking damages to overcome.
B. Obstacles to Injunctive Relief.- The Standing Hurdle
Just as courts have restricted damages actions under section 1983
through the various immunity doctrines, they have used the constitutional
requirement of standing to deny plaintiffs injunctive relief. The doctrine
of "standing to sue" requires that plaintiffs have "sufficient stake in an
otherwise justiciable controversy to obtain judicial resolution of that
controversy."' 49 It derives from the requirement of the Constitution that
prevents courts from hearing matters that do not raise a "case or
controversy"' 5 ° and from principles of judicial restraint that deter the
courts from considering matters in which plaintiffs are thought to lack an
incentive to pursue their causes diligently. 5' Standing typically
requires that plaintiffs show three things:
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in fact"-an invasion
of a legally-protected interest which is (a) concrete and
particularized, . . and (b) "actual or imminent, not 'conjectural' or
'hypothetical . . ."' Second, there must be a causal connection
between the injury and the conduct complained of-the injury has to
be "fairly ... trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant,
and not . . . th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third
party not before the court." Third, it must be "likely," as opposed to
merely "speculative," that the injury will be "redressed by a favorable
decision."' 52
In the early 1970s, the Supreme Court took a liberal approach to
standing. In a classic case on the subject, United States v. Students
Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), ' the Court
allowed environmental groups to challenge "the ICC's failure to suspend
a surcharge on railroad freight rates as unlawful under the Interstate
Commerce Commission Act."'5 4 The plaintiffs, who claimed to use the
outdoor areas of metropolitan Washington, met the injury in fact
149. BLACK'S LAW DICnoNARY 1405 (6th ed. 1990).
150. U.S. CONST. art. IlI.
15 1. Baker v. Cart, 369 U.S. 186,204 (1962) ("Have the appellants alleged such a personal stake
in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions? This is the gist of the question of standing.").
152. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2136 (1992) (citations and footnotes
omitted).
153. 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
154. GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUIONAL LAw 97 (2d ed. 1991).
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requirement because the rate increase might boost the use of
nonrecyclable goods, which in turn could damage the environment in
which the plaintiffs frolicked.
SCRAP was a fringe case even in 1973, and "[i]t is not at all
clear.. . that [it] could command a majority today.""' In fact, the
Court now seems to be using standing aggressively to limit access to the
federal courts. For example, in its most recent decision on the issue,
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,' 6 the Court ruled that the Defenders of
Wildlife, a conservation group, lacked standing to seek an injunction
forcing the Secretary of the Interior to reinstate a regulation that required
all federal agencies to consult with the Secretary before doing anything
at home or abroad that would jeopardize any endangered or threatened
species.' 57 While acknowledging that "the desire to use or observe an
animal species, even for purely aesthetic purposes, is undeniably a
cognizable interest for purpose[s] of standing," the Court held that
plaintiff had to show "not only that listed species were in fact being
threatened by [the now unrestricted] funded activities abroad, but also
that one or more of the group's members would thereby be 'directly'
affected apart from their 'special interest" in th[e] subject. 1'
' S8
Plaintiff's showing that two of its members had seen American agencies'
impact on endangered species abroad would not be enough unless the
group could prove not only that the members intended to return to the
affected areas but that they already had some concrete plans to do so-in
other words, that the injury was imminent." 9
For present purposes, the key case on standing is City of Los Angeles
v. Lyons. 6" In Lyons, the plaintiff had been the victim of a particular
chokehold used by police to restrain arrestees, which rendered him
unconscious and damaged his larynx. He sued to enjoin the Los Angeles
Police Department from using the chokehold to restrain suspects unless
it was necessary to prevent the immediate use of deadly force.' 6' The
Court held that the plaintiff lacked standing to seek injunctive relief. As
in any other case, the Lyons Court said, the plaintiff must establish that
he has a "'personal stake in the outcome. 1'162 Because "'[p]ast
155. Id. at 98.
156. 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992).
157. The Secretary had limited the regulation so that it applied only to agency activities in the
United States and on the high seas.
158. 112 S. Ct. at 2137-38 (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 735 (1972)).
159. Id. at 2138.
160. 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
161. Id. at 97-98.
162. Id. at 101 (quoting Baker v. Car, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)).
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exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or
controversy regarding injunctive relief . . . if unaccompanied by any
continuing, present adverse effects,"' the case or controversy requirement
was not met.' 63 Moreover, the Lyons Court established an additional
hurdle that confronts plaintiffs seeking injunctive relief. It held that, even
if such plaintiffs satisfied the case or controversy requirement for
standing, they would still need to show "the likelihood of substantial and
immediate irreparable injury, and the inadequacy of remedies at law."'"
Without showing a "real or immediate threat" that he would be subjected
to the chokehold again, plaintiff lacked standing to seek injunctive
relief.
61
Under Lyons and Lucas, unless a section 1983 plaintiff can show a
substantial likelihood of being subjected to another strip
search-presumably a difficult thing to show-she will be denied an
injunction on the basis of standing. Like claims for damages, actions for
injunctive relief are severely limited by the Supreme Court's section 1983
jurisprudence. As one commentator put it, "the Court.. . has engaged
in an aggressive reconstruction of the scope of § 1983. This reorientation
of civil rights jurisprudence has blunted the impact of § 1983. ''I66 As
will be discussed in Part V, these developments in the law of section
1983 affect the substantive law in a way that limits the relief available to
students who are subjected to strip searches.
IV. Student Strip Searches Before and After New Jersey v. T.L. 0.
[W]e balance the [F]ourth [A]mendment rights of individual students
with the interest of the state and the school officials in the
maintenance of a proper educational environment to educate today's
youth. 67
Tarter v. Raybuck (1984)
[Our] flexible standard allows a school administrator or court to
weigh the interest of a school in maintaining order against the
substantial privacy interests of students in their bodies.'68
Cornfield v. Consolidated High School District No. 230 (1993)
163. Id. at 102 (quoting O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495-96 (1974)).
164. Id. at 103 (quoting O'Shea, 414 U.S. at 502).
165. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 105.
166. Rudovsky, supra note 105, at 25-26.
167. Tarter v. Raybuck, 742 F.2d 977, 982 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1051 (1985).
168. Cornfield v. Consolidated High Sch. Dist. No. 230, 991 F.2d 1316, 1320 (7th Cir. 1993).
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Before New Jersey v. TL.O. set forth the standard by which searches
in the public schools are to be evaluated, courts had some difficulty
deciding whether strip searches were constitutional, perhaps because of
the necessarily fact-specific nature of each inquiry. As the quotations
above suggest and as this Part will show, TL. 0. has done little to change
or clarify the law in this area. Section A below examines strip search
cases that arose before T.L.O. and outlines the key factors that courts
considered in evaluating the searches' constitutionality. Section B applies
the same treatment to cases arising after T.L.O. and concludes that,
although the general Fourth Amendment standard for school searches is
now in less doubt, courts continue to differ over what constitutes a
constitutional strip search.
A. Strip Search Cases Before New Jersey v. T.L.O.
Of course, strip searches had been conducted in schools and
challenged in the courts long before T.L.O. was decided. This section
examines the most important pre-1985 cases in detail and summarizes the
state of the law as it existed before T. L. 0.
The T.L.O. Court asserted that at the time of its decision, the lower
courts had not completely resolved whether the Fourth Amendment
applied to school officials at all.' 69 And indeed in one case, D.RC. v.
State,7" a court had held that a strip search did not violate the Fourth
Amendment because the officials conducting the search were not involved
in either of the activities at which the Amendment's restrictions are
aimed--"investigations of those suspected of crime by those performing
the function of police officers" and "area-wide exploratory investigations,
with or without a suspect, carried out by specialized law enforcement
officers in order to prevent crime (including violation of health and safety
regulations)."'' But D.KC. was the only strip search case found'72
that took this view; the vast majority of courts that had ruled on strip
searches had held that the Fourth Amendment applied to school officials
as it did to other government actors.'73
169. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
170. 646 P.2d 252 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982).
171. Id. at 260.
172. The strip search cases considered in this paper were all reported after 1976. There may
have been earlier cases, but a Westlaw search uncovered only the cases cited herein.
173. See, e.g., Bellnier v. Lund, 438 F. Supp. 47, 52-53 (N.D.N.Y. 1977) (setting out the four
theories of the Fourth Amendment's application to public schools and deciding to apply the
amendment "but with a lesser standard than probable cause with respect to student searches"); Bilbrey
v. Brown, 738 F.2d 1462 (9th Cir. 1984) (applying the Fourth Amendment); Tarter v. Raybuck, 742
F.2d 977 (6th Cir. 1984) (same), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1051 (1985).
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Similarly, the courts were in fairly close agreement about what
standards should govern the constitutionality of strip searches under the
Fourth Amendment. The cases discussed below illustrate these standards.
1. The Basic Approach: Tarter v. Raybuck.' -The Sixth Circuit's
decision in Tarter v. Raybuck typifies the strip search cases from this
period. In Tarter, school officials saw David Tarter, a high school
student, exchanging money and plastic bags containing what they
believed was marijuana. They took Tarter and several others aside and
asked them to empty their coat pockets. The officials found no evidence
that incriminated Tarter, but one of them smelled marijuana on Tarter's
breath. Tarter was taken to the office, where he was informed of the
officials' suspicions. Two of the male officials then took Tarter into a
smaller room, where they had him empty his pockets and remove his
jacket, boots, and shirt. Again, no incriminating evidence was found.
The officials then asked Tarter to remove his pants. Tarter refused to do
so, and the search ended. Tarter sued under section 1983, alleging that
the unlawful search violated his constitutional rights.'75 The district
court upheld the search, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed.'76
While the Sixth Circuit recognized that the Fourth Amendment
applies to school officials, it also noted that "the basic concern of the
[amendment] is reasonableness, and reasonableness depends upon the
particular circumstances. Although incursions on the [F]ourth
Amendment should be guarded jealously, not infrequently the ordinary
requirements of the [amendment] are modified to deal with special
circumstances."' 77 The court found that such circumstances existed in
the school context and adopted a balancing test: "[W]e balance the
[F]ourth [A]mendment rights of individual students with the interest of
the state and the school officials in the maintenance of a proper
educational environment to educate today's youth.' 78  More
specifically, the court held that
a school official or teacher's reasonable search of a student's person
does not violate the student's [F]ourth [A]mendment rights, if the
school official has reasonable cause to believe the search is necessary
in the furtherance of maintaining school discipline and order, or his
duty to maintain a safe environment conducive to education.
179
174. 742 F.2d 977 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1051 (1985).
175. Id. at 979-80.
176. Id. at 979, 983.
177. Id. at 981-82 (citation omitted).
178. Id. at 982.
179. Tarter, 742 F.2d at 982.
STRIP SEARCHES
For a search to be reasonable, both the grounds for instituting the search
and the extent of the search must be reasonable.
The decision in Tarter establishes that (a) strip searches of students
are governed by the Fourth Amendment; (b) the permissibility of such
searches depends on a rather loosely defined balancing of the student's
interests against the government's; (c) to justify strip searches, school
officials must show only "reasonable cause," not probable cause; and (d)
both the beginning of the search and its ultimate scope must be
reasonable. Other pre-1985 cases reached similar conclusions,80 and
it is interesting to note that the general standard set forth in T.L.O. itself
closely resembles the Tarter rule.""'
2. Individualized Suspicion Required: Belinier v. Lund. 112-One
of the most cited strip search cases, Bellnier v. Lund stands for the
proposition that strip searches require individualized suspicion. In
Bellnier, all the students in a fifth grade classroom were subjected to strip
searches to find one student's missing three dollars. The student reported
the missing money to the teacher, who asked the class for information
about it, but to no avail. Having heard complaints of missing items from
other students on previous days, the teacher, with the help of other school
officials, began a search of the class. They first searched the students'
coats, which were hanging in a separate area of the classroom. Then they
asked the students to empty their pockets and their shoes. Next, the
school officials took the class members to their respective lavatories and
ordered them to strip down to their underwear. The missing money was
not found. Finally, the students were returned to the classroom and their
desks and books were searched. Again, nothing was found. The entire
investigation lasted two hours; the strip searches took about fifteen
minutes.'83 The plaintiffs sued the school officials under section 1983,
seeking redress for an allegedly unlawful strip search.' 84
The court first reviewed the authorities and concluded that the
Fourth Amendment applied, but that the exclusionary rule and the
probable cause standard were inappropriate in the school setting, since
school officials are more like parents than enforcers of the criminal
180. See Doe v. Renfrow, 631 F.2d 91(7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1022 (1981); M.M.
v. Anker, 607 F.2d 588 (2d Cir. 1979); Bellnier v. Lund, 438 F. Supp. 47 (N.D.N.Y. 1977).
181. See supra text accompanying notes 56-58.
182. 438 F. Supp. 47 (N.D.N.Y. 1977).
183. Id. at 50.
184. Id. at 49.
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law. '5 It applied a balancing framework quite similar to the one set
forth in Tarter and reached a similar conclusion:
This Court holds that, while there need not be a showing of probable
cause in a case such as this, there must be demonstrated the existence
of some articulable facts which together provided reasonable grounds
to search the students, and that the search must have been in
furtherance of a legitimate purpose with respect to which school
officials are empowered to act, such as the maintenance of discipline
or the detection and punishment of misconduct." 6
Most importantly for present purposes, the court held that the searches at
issue did not meet its standard because "[t]here were no facts . . . which
allowed the officials to particularize with respect to which students might
possess the money, something which has time and again ... been found
to be necessary to a reasonable search under the Fourth
Amendment."'1 7 In other words, an intrusive search cannot be justified
without individualized suspicion."'8
3. Probable Cause for Severe Intrusions?: M.M. v.
Anker.' 9-Although it agreed with the general rule that "there are
searches in the school enclave that satisfy Fourth Amendment
requirements when based on less than probable cause," the Second Circuit
in MM v. Anker also asserted that, "when a teacher conducts a highly
intrusive invasion such as the strip search in this case, it is reasonable to
require that probable cause be present."' 90  Although other decisions
were not as explicit about their views and tended to adhere to the more
lenient "reasonable grounds" standard, some seemed to agree with the
MM court that the more intrusive the search, the more justification the
school officials would have to provide for it. In Tarter, for example, the
court cautioned that "[w]e note that not only must there be a reasonable
ground to institute the search, the search itself must be reasonable."''
The court continued:
185. Id. at 51-53.
186. Id. at 53.
187. Bellnier, 438 F. Supp. at 54.
188. Other courts have followed Bellnier in this requirement. See, e.g., Tarter v. Raybuck, 742
F.2d 977, 983 (6th Cir. 1984) (emphasizing that "particularized suspicion of specific individuals" is
an important factor in determining whether school officials have reasonable grounds for a search),
cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1051 (1985).
189. 607 F.2d 588 (2d Cir. 1979).
190. Id. at 589.
191. Tarter v. Raybuck, 742 F.2d 977, 982 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1051 (1985).
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Thus, for example, the authority of the school official would not
justify a degrading body cavity search of a youth in order to
determine whether a student was in possession of contraband in
violation of school rules. There the [F]ourth [Ajmendment and
privacy interests of the youth would clearly outweigh any interest in
school discipline or order which might be served by such a
search.' 92
Although it upheld the partial strip search at issue, the Tarter court, like
that in MM, indicated that in certain extreme situations, school officials
would reach a line they could not cross.
Similarly, in Doe v. Renfrow, 93 the Seventh Circuit announced its
aversion to strip searches in a brief but often-cited opinion that continues
to influence courts today. The plaintiff in Renfrow was one of 2780 high
school students searched by dog sniffs. Students to whom the dogs
"alerted," including the thirteen-year-old plaintiff, were compelled to strip
nude and submit to a search for contraband. The plaintiff sued, alleging
that both searches-the dog sniff and the strip search-violated her civil
rights. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's opinion, which,
like most other pre-1985 cases, held that searches in the schools must be
supported by "reasonable cause."' 94  But in memorable language, the
court of appeals reversed the lower court's determination that the school
officials were immune from liability, holding that the officials had to be
held accountable for their conduct:
It does not require a constitutional scholar to conclude that a nude
search of a thirteen-year-old child is an invasion of constitutional
rights of some magnitude. More than that: it is a violation of any
known principle of human decency. Apart from any constitutional
readings and rulings, simple common sense would indicate that the
conduct of the school officials in permitting such a nude search was
not only unlawful but outrageous under "settled indisputable principles
of law." . . . We suggest as strongly as possible that the conduct
herein described exceeded the "bounds of reason" by two and a half
country miles. 5
Although not all pre-TL.O courts agreed with the outrage the Seventh
Circuit expressed when faced with extremely intrusive searches, it
represents a view that continues to influence strip search decisions today.
192. Id. at 982-83.
193. 631 F.2d 91 (7th.Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1022 (1982).
194. Id. at 92.
195. Id. at 92-93 (quoting Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 321 (1975)).
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Before 1985, courts had fairly well settled on a standard for
evaluating student strip searches that closely resembles the one that
TL.O. set out for all school search cases. But the courts had also
espoused requirements of individual suspicion and their opinions
contained a healthy dose of skepticism about intrusions as severe as strip
searches.
B. Strip Search Cases Since T.L.O.
Since 1985, strip searches in the public schools have been governed
by New Jersey v. T. L. 0. Perhaps not surprisingly, the four cases reported
since TL. 0. reveal that courts have the same concerns today that they did
before TL. 0. Like section A above, this section synthesizes the various
legal standards that have surfaced in the cases and examines how courts
have evaluated the constitutionality of strip searches.
1. The Basics: The T.L.O. Framework.-All the post-1985 strip
search cases have one thing in common: they rely on the framework
established in TL.O. Therefore, the probable cause standard does not
apply. Rather, searches are upheld if they are reasonable at their
inception and reasonable in scope. The appropriate analysis for
addressing these reasonableness questions was summarized neatly in the
Seventh Circuit's decision in Cornfield v. Consolidated High School
District No. 230.196 In Cornfield, a teacher had reported that the
plaintiff "appeared 'too well-endowed."" 9 This observation led school
officials to believe that the plaintiff was "crotching" drugs. The
plaintiffs teacher and the school's dean (both men) took the plaintiff to
the boys' locker room. Standing more than ten feet away on either side
of the plaintiff, they had him remove his clothing and change into a gym
uniform. They watched him change and inspected his clothes but found
nothing, so they let him go home. The plaintiff sued under section 1983,
alleging that the search violated his constitutional rights.98 The court
first set out the controlling standard, which it derived from T.L.O.:
"Justified at its inception" in the present context does not mean that
a school administrator has the right to search a student who merely
acts in a way that creates a reasonable suspicion that the student has
violated some regulation or law. Rather, a search is warranted only
if the student's conduct creates a reasonable suspicion that a particular
regulation or law has been violated, with the search serving to
196. 991 F.2d 1316 (7th Cir. 1993).
197. Id. at 1319.
198. Id.
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produce evidence of that violation. Second, the search must be
permissible in scope: "[T]he measures adopted are reasonably related
to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light
of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction."'99
Applying this test to the case before it, the Seventh Circuit found that the
search at issue was reasonable. It was justified at its inception because,
although the officials had only observed the unusual bulge in plaintiffs
crotch once, a number of independent factors supported their suspicions
that he possessed drugs, including statements the plaintiff himself had
made about dealing drugs and hiding them by "crotching," reports from
his bus driver that he smelled of marijuana, and information from other
students that he had had drugs on his person in the past."° The search
was justified in scope because it was the "least intrusive way to confirm
or deny [the officials'] suspicions," was conducted "in the privacy of the
boys' locker room," and did not involve any physical contact.20 1
The standard espoused in Cornfield is essentially the same as that
used in the three other post-TL.O. strip search cases.2 °2 It can be
broken down into several components. First, searches are reasonable only
if prompted by "reasonable suspicion." Second, any intrusion must be
reasonable in light of the objectives of the search. Third, the search must
not be excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student.
Finally, it must not be excessively intrusive in light of the nature of the
infraction. 203  The remaining subsections help give content to these
components.
2. Reasonable Suspicion: Cales v. Howell Public Schools.2°4-The
first court to apply TL. 0. in the strip search context confined itself to the
first prong of the two-part T.L. 0. test-whether the search was reasonable
at its inception. The plaintiff in Cales, a fifteen-year-old student, was
seen in the parking lot of the school during class hours "attempting to
avoid detection by 'ducking' behind a parked car., 2 1 She was taken
to the principal's office, where the contents of her purse were dumped
out, revealing some school "readmittance slips" that she was not supposed
199. Id. at 1320 (quoting T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341-42).
200. Id. at 1322.
201. Cornfield, 991 F.2d at 1323.
202. Williams v. Ellington, 936 F.2d 881, 886 (6th Cir. 1991); Cales v. Howell Pub. Schs., 635
F. Supp. 454, 456-57 (E.D. Mich. 1985); State v. Mark Anthony B., 433 S.E.2d 41, 45 (W. Va.
1993).
203. Cornfield, 991 F.2d at 1320.
204. 635 F. Supp. 454 (E.D. Mich. 1985).
205. Id. at 455.
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to have. She was then told to turn her jean pockets inside-out. She
subsequently removed her jeans entirely. Plaintiff was then told to bend
over so that the school official could "visually examine the contents of
her brassiere." She was not touched during the search."0 6
The plaintiff sued under section 1983, alleging that the search
violated her constitutional rights. Laying out the Fourth Amendment
standard, the court relied on TL.O. for the proposition that "a search of
a student by a teacher or other school official will be 'justified at its
inception' when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the
search will turn up evidence that the student has violated or is violating
either the law or the rules of the school."2 °7  The officials failed to
meet this threshold requirement (the first prong of the T.L.O. test)
because while "[iut is clear that plaintiff's conduct created a reasonable
suspicion for suspecting that some school rule or law had been violated,"
it "could have indicated that she was a truant, or that she was stealing
hubcaps, or that she had left class to meet a boyfriend. In short, it could
have signified that plaintiff had violated any of an infinite number of
laws or school rules."2 8 The court continued:
This Court does not read TLO so broadly as to allow a school
administrator the right to search a student because that student acts in
such a way so as to create a reasonable suspicion that the student has
violated some rule or law. Rather, the burden is on the administrator
to establish that the student's conduct is such that it creates a
reasonable suspicion that a specific rule or law has been violated and
that a search could reasonably be expected to produce evidence of that
violation. 9
The court concluded that the administrators had not met their burden and
that therefore the search was unreasonable; any inquiry into the second
("scope") prong of T.L.O. was unnecessary.10 The court in Cornfield,
applying the same standard, reached the opposite conclusion because
there was considerable evidence from a variety of sources that pointed to
an identifiable offense-marijuana possession.2"' The other two




207. Id. at 456 (quoting TL.O., 469 U.S. at 341-42).
208. Id. at 457.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. See supra notes 196-201 (discussing Cornfield).
212. See Williams v. Ellington, 936 F.2d 881 (6th Cir. 1991); State v. Mark Anthony B., 433
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3. The Role of Age and Sex.-The general standard set forth in
T.L.O. stated that searches should not be "excessively intrusive in light
of the age and sex of the student,"2 3 and strip search cases since 1985
have at least mentioned these factors in their analyses. As far as sex is
concerned, it seems a natural requirement that the searcher and the
subject of the search be of the same sex, and there is little dispute on this
issue. Indeed, the Cornfield court seemed to take the point for granted
when it asserted that "[a] nude search of a student by an administrator or
teacher of the opposite sex would obviously violate [the] standard."2 4
Similarly, the student's age is a key factor in determining the
reasonableness of strip searches, as courts had recognized long before
T.L. 0 .2" But here the Cornfield court parted ways with the past. Its
discussion of the age aspect of the strip search standard is unique among
strip search cases in that the court actually paused to analyze why age
should matter. First, it said, older children are more likely to have
criminal capacity and therefore more likely to participate in criminal
activity. Second, an older child will have a more meaningful capacity to
consent to a search. Drawing on the ancient "rule of sevens,"2 6 the
court said that it "would naturally be much more circumspect about
[younger children's] ability to comprehend the impact of a strip search,
or to consent to one."2 7  In sum, the court concluded that "the
legitimate expectations of privacy that students in school may claim are
not monolithic," but vary with age.2"'
4. T.L.O. as a Sliding-Scale Standard.-MM v. Anker and some
other cases discussed above2t 9 indicated that at least some pre-1985
courts were willing to raise the Fourth Amendment requirement to
probable cause when highly intrusive searches were involved. As strip
search cases since 1985 have recognized, the T.L.O. standard embodies
a similar sliding scale of reasonableness: the greater the intrusion, the
S.E.2d 41 (W. Va. 1993).
213. 469 U.S. at 342.
214. Cornfield v. Consolidated High Sch. Dist. No. 230, 991 F.2d 1316, 1320 (7th Cir. 1993).
215. See, e.g., Bellnier v. Lund, 438 F. Supp. 47, 53 (N.D.N.Y. 1977) (listing "the child's age"
as one of the "factors which warrant consideration" in analyzing the reasonableness of a search).
216. The rule, a common-law doctrine, held that children under the age of seven were considered
to be without criminal capacity. Children over the age of fourteen were said to have the same
criminal capacity as adults. Children between seven and fourteen were presumed incapable of
committing crimes, but the presumption was rebuttable. Cornfeld, 991 F.2d at 1321.
217. Id.
218. Id. Similar rationales help explain why strip search cases do not arise at the college level.
See supra note 8 (discussing other differences between college students and younger students).
219. See supra notes 189-95.
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greater the justification for it must be. In Cornfield, for example, the
court read T.L.O. to require that "as the intrusiveness of the search of a
student intensifies, so too does the standard of Fourth Amendment
reasonableness. What may constitute reasonable suspicion for a search
of a locker or even a pocket or pocketbook may fall well short of
reasonableness for a nude search."22
The court in State v. Mark Anthony B.22" ' went even further. In
Mark Anthony B., a teacher discovered that $100 in cash was missing
from her purse. She reported the incident to a school social worker, who
soon learned that the defendant, a fourteen-year-old student, had been
assigned minor janitorial duties and had likely been alone in the teacher's
classroom. Moreover, the student was serving a two-year probation term
for burglary. When confronted, the student admitted to having been in
the classroom alone, but denied having taken the money. The social
worker had the student pull out his pockets and roll down his socks, but
found nothing. He informed the principal of the situation. The principal
took the student into the boys' bathroom, looked in his pockets and
socks, and then asked the student to take off his pants. The student
lowered his pants to his knees. The principal asked him to pull his
underwear out in front and back. The money was in the back of the
student's underwear. The teacher subsequently initiated criminal
proceedings against the student, who sought to exclude the evidence on
the grounds that it was obtained through an unlawful strip search.222
The West Virginia Supreme Court held that the school officials had
satisfied prong one of the test; because the student already had a criminal
record and was known to have been alone in the room from which the
money was stolen, the officials had reasonable grounds to search him.
The court then turned to the second prong of the test: whether the
search as actually performed was excessively intrusive. Noting that "the
United States Supreme Court has never decided a case which involved a
strip search of students, nor did the T.L.O. Court indicate whether its
reasonableness standard would apply to strip searches of students, 223
the court asserted:
At some point, a line must be drawn which imposes limits upon how
intrusive a student search can be. We certainly cannot imagine ever
condoning a search that is any more physically intrusive than the one
now before us .... The T.L.O. Court obviously intended for there
220. Cornfield, 991 F.2d at 1321.
221. 433 S.E.2d 41 (W. Va. 1993).
222. Id. at 42-43.
223. Id. at 45.
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to be constraints on how far a search could ultimately extend, even
when there are "reasonable grounds" and/or an individualized
suspicion to justify the initial search.224
The court found that the search in the case before it could not be upheld
as reasonable. Although stealing "should never be condoned or
encouraged in our schools," it "did not pose the type of immediate danger
to others than might conceivably necessitate and justify a warrantless strip
search. The scope of this particular search exceeded what could be
defined as reasonable under the circumstances., 2 5  The court
concluded: "[I]n the absence of exigent circumstances which necessitate
an immediate search in order to ensure the safety of other students, a
warrantless strip search of a student conducted by a school official is
presumed to be 'excessively intrusive' and thus unreasonable in
scope., 226 Like Cornfield, Mark Anthony B. indicates that T.L.O.
established a sliding-scale test for evaluating searches in the public
schools, and that test often requires significant justification before a strip
search will be considered reasonable.
Somewhat in contrast is the Sixth Circuit's recent decision in
Williams v. Ellington.22 7  In Ellington, the section 1983 plaintiff,
Angela Williams, alleged that school officials had violated her
constitutional rights through an unlawful strip search. The principal of
the school had received information that Williams and another girl,
Michelle, had been sniffing a white powder in class and had offered it to
another student. A typing teacher who was asked about the two girls
recalled Michelle's strange behavior on one occasion and a note Williams
had typed months before that mentioned parties involving "the rich man's
drug." The principal talked to both Williams's and Michelle's families,
and Michelle's father "expressed concern that she might be using
drugs."228 Then the same girl who had originally told the principal
about Michelle and Williams came to him and reported that the two were
at it again. After questioning the informant, the principal called the girls
out of class and took them to the administrative offices, where he told
them of his suspicions. Michelle produced a vial containing "rush," a
volatile substance that was legal to possess but not to inhale. Williams's
lockers, purse, and books were searched, but yielded no evidence of
drugs. Then Williams was strip-searched. She had to empty her pockets,
224. Id. at 48-49.
225. Id. at 49.
226. Id.
227. Williams, 936 F.2d 881 (6th Cir. 1991).
228. Id. at 882.
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remove her t-shirt, remove her shoes and socks, and lower her pants to
her knees. Finally, although there was a factual dispute on the matter,
Williams alleged that the official conducting the search pulled out the
elastic on her underwear. Again, no evidence of drugs was found.229
The court granted the school officials summary judgment on
immunity grounds, ruling in part that "it was not unreasonable [for the
principal] to believe that the ordered searches were not a violation of
Angela Williams' constitutional rights." 3° Addressing the second
prong of the TL.O. test (the "reasonable in scope" prong), the court
compared the continued searches of Williams and her property-'to the
second search in T.L.O., which the Supreme Court held was justified
because the first search had uncovered evidence of drug use (the rolling
papers), and held that the searches were not unreasonable. It did so even
though (a) almost all of the "reasonable suspicion" the officials could
muster involved Michelle, not Williams, (b) the search in this case was
much more intrusive than the one in TL.O., and (c) there was no
additional evidence found (like the rolling papers in T.L.O.) that would
justify continued and increasingly invasive searches. In support of its
conclusion, the court asserted that
[a] thorough review of TL.O. reveals that the Court was careful to
protect a school official's right to make discretionary decisions in
light of the knowledge and experience of the educator and the
information presented to him or her at the time such decision was
made. Like police officers, school officials need discretionary
authority to function with great efficiency and speed in certain
situations, so long as these decisions are consistent with certain
constitutional safeguards. To question an official's every decision
with the benefit of hindsight would undermine the authority necessary
to ensure the safety and order of our schools.23" '
5. Conclusion.-The preceding discussion illustrates some common
threads and differing opinions among strip search cases decided since
T.L.O. What is reasonable will necessarily vary not only with the age
and sex of the student, the intrusiveness of the search, the nature of the
government interest involved, and the conditions at the particular school,
but also with the court faced with deciding what is permissible and what
is not. The differing opinions in Ellington and Mark Anthony B. are a
perfect illustration of this phenomenon.
229. Id. at 882-83.
230. Id. at 886.
231. Id.
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In sum, although the Fourth Amendment standard governing strip
searches in the public schools is clearer after the TL.O. decision, the
substantive law is not much different and there are still considerable
discrepancies in its application. All accept the proposition that
warrantless strip searches must be reasonable at their inception and
reasonable in scope, but what 'reasonable' means is as unclear today as
it was just before T.L.O. was decided in January 1985.
V. When Are Student Strip Searches Constitutional?
[I]n the absence of exigent circumstances which necessitate an
immediate search in order to ensure the safety of other students, a
warrantless strip search of a student conducted by a school official is
presumed to be "excessively intrusive" and thus unreasonable in
scope.232
Children are not adults. Schools stand in loco parentis and are
entitled to do anything that a parent could do under similar
circumstances to protect the health, safety and morals of a child and
to maintain the proper functioning of the school. If we wonder why
our schools are going to hell in a handbasket, it's probably because
of decisions like this one.233
The sharply. divided opinions in State v. Mark Anthony B.,
234
excerpted above, and the conflicting decisions discussed in Part IV
illustrate the difficulty lower courts are having in applying TL.O. to the
strip search context. 5  Some opinions, like the Mark Anthony B.
majority's, stand firmly against strip searches. Others, like the Sixth
Circuit's unanimous decision in Williams v. Ellington,236  defer
substantially to school officials. Both seem to find support in T.L.O.
Such uncertainty can prove extremely problematic for those who
seek to vindicate their constitutional rights. As Part III showed, where
there is even a modest amount of uncertainty in the underlying
substantive law, section 1983 hurdles bar relief even for those who
prevail on the merits.237 In fact, the Ellington decision turned largely
on this very issue. Because the court could not find any cases that
clearly established the plaintiff's right to be free from strip searches of
the kind she suffered, it granted the school officials qualified immunity:
232. State v. Mark Anthony B., 433 S.E.2d 41, 49 (W. Va. 1993).
233. Id. (Neely, J., dissenting).
234. 433 S.E.2d 41 (W. Va. 1993).
235. See supra part IV.
236. 936 F.2d 881 (6th Cir. 1991).
237. See supra part III.
99 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW FALL 1994
To determine what rights are "clearly established," we must look to
decisions from the Supreme Court and from courts within this
circuit . . . A diligent but unsuccessful search for additional
guidance [beyond that provided in T.L.O.i from the designated
jurisdictional pool leads us to a troubling conclusion: the
reasonableness standard articulated in New Jersey v. T.L.O., has left
courts later confronted with the issue either reluctant or unable to
define what type of conduct would be subject to a 42 U.S.C. § 1983
cause of action. . . . [S]uch courts have been virtually silent in
defining these rights. Based upon the rights that were "clearly
established" at the time of the search in question, we grant qualified
immunity to Defendants sued in their individual capacity.238
The court also denied the plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief, holding
under City of Los Angeles v. Lyons239 that "because Williams has failed
to show any real threat of immediate injury, her claim for injunctive
relief does not warrant the issuance of an injunction. '240
Neither underenforcement of the Fourth Amendment nor uncertainty
in the law construing it should deprive schoolchildren of their
constitutional rights. In the interests of clarifying constitutional rights
and protecting schoolchildren against overzealous government officials,
this Part seeks to define more carefully what standard should govern strip
search cases. Section A points out weaknesses in the courts' current
approach to strip searches under T. L. 0. Section B then proposes a new,
better defined standard for strip searches that would solve many of these
problems. Finally, section C gives several examples of how the new
standard would function in practice.
A. The Problem: Misapplication of the T.L.O. Standard
According to TL.0., the Fourth Amendment requires that searches
of students in the public schools be reasonable at their inception and
reasonable in scope. To elaborate:
[A] search of a student by a teacher or other school official will be
"justified at its inception" when there are reasonable grounds for
suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the student has
violated or is violating either the law or the rules of the school. Such
a search will be permissible in its scope when the measures adopted
are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not
238. Ellington, 936 F.2d at 885-87.
239. 461 U.S. 95 (1983). For a full discussion of Lyons, see supra notes 160-65 and
accompanying text.
240. Ellington, 936 F.2d at 889.
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excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the
nature of the infraction.
The Court in T.L.O. explained that its intent in setting out such a standard
was to balance the rights of schoolchildren against the legitimate needs
of the school system. While "spar[ing] teachers and school administrators
the necessity of schooling themselves in the niceties of probable cause
and permit[ting] them to regulate their conduct according to the dictates
of reason and common sense," the standard "should [also] ensure that the
interests of students will be invaded no more than is necessary to achieve
the legitimate end of preserving order in the schools. '242  Although
Justice Brennan in T.L.O. itself 43 and many commentators since
then2 4 have argued that this standard is simply too indefinite to protect
children's rights, it at least takes a pragmatic approach to the problem by
recognizing the compromise that must necessarily be struck between the
competing interests. Still, TL.O. 's critics are correct in the sense that,
although the decision could be used to ensure a fair balance of interests,
in practice its "mushiness" gives courts too much leeway to permit
infringements on individual rights. Indeed, the T.L.O. majority itself
arguably misapplied its own standard. In its assessment of whether the
search was reasonable at its inception, the Court overlooked the fact that
Choplick did not have a "need to search" the purse sufficient to outweigh
T.L.O.'s privacy interest: he already had eyewitness evidence that T.L.O.
had broken the no smoking rule, so his "need" was minimal, especially
in light of the minor nature of the rule. Moreover,
[t]he result in T.L.O. is further puzzling in light of the Court's
admonition that the "age and sex of the student and the nature of the
infraction" be included in the balancing calculus. The Court in fact
never considered these factors in its T.L.O. balancing calculus nor
explained how or why they are relevant.
245
241. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341-42 (1985).
242. Id. at 343.
243. Id. at 353-70 (Brennan and Marshall, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
244. Martin R. Gardner, Student Privacy in the Wake ofT.L.O.: An Appealfor an Individualized
Suspicion Requirement for Valid Searches and Seizures in the Schools, 22 GA. L. REv. 897, 920
(1988) ("Some now fear that by embracing [a balancing or sliding-scale] approach, T.L.O. opens the
door for wholesale abandonment of principled, rule-oriented jurisprudence in favor of case by case
assessments of 'reasonableness' in which the government usually prevails and privacy takes a back
seat.") (footnotes omitted).
245. Id. at 922 (quoting TL.O., 469 U.S. at 342) (footnote omitted). See also Charles W. Avery
& Robert J. Simpson, Search and Seizure: A Risk Assessment Modelfor Public School Officials, 16
J.L. & EDUC. 403, 407-08 (1987):
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Courts applying the T.L.O. standard to strip searches have similarly
underemphasized the students' interest. Williams v. Ellington, for
example, has been criticized for failing to address such factors as the
student's age, the history of drug use in the school as a whole, and the
disciplinary record of the student, all of which would have been relevant
to the balance.246 More importantly, the Ellington court, in drawing a
parallel between the strip search at issue and the much less invasive
examination of the student's purse in TL.O., completely overlooked the
nature of the intrusion.247 One commentator asserted that "[t]he court
reached its conclusion .. .with virtually no analysis of the issue.2 48
It
assumed the standard for such searches had been clearly decided in
T.L.O. . . [and] applied the [reasonableness] standard in a
remarkably cursory fashion .... The court gave no consideration
whatsoever to whether a strip search was "excessively intrusive in
light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the
infraction." In short, the court essentially assumed, for Fourth
Amendment purposes, that there was no difference between the search
of a student's purse and the search of her pants. 49
When courts like the Sixth Circuit in Ellington neglect the individual
rights side of the balance, they permit schools to conduct searches that
damage students in a number of ways. First, and most important, looking
only at the government's interests means ignoring the fact that a strip
search is among the most serious possible intrusions upon someone's
privacy. Even if common sense did not make this clear, courts have said
repeatedly (on the occasions that they have taken time to consider the
The "reasonable suspicion" standard set by the courts lacks the precision and clarity
necessary to serve as a ready tool for school officials in fulfilling their duties. For
example:
1. How does this standard relate to the genera! search versus the particularized
search?
2. How does police involvement, prior or otherwise, alter the lawfulness of the
search?
3. Under what circumstances, if any, is a strip search justified?
4. Are articles placed in a student's car or locker given less protection than articles
places on a student's person or purse?
5. In short, what are the consequences and legal safeguards associated with particular
types of searches?
Again, what is reasonable?
246. Tamela J. White, Note, Williams by Williams v. Ellington: Strip Searches in Public
Schools-Too Many Unanswered Questions, 19 N. KY. L. REV. 513, 539-40 (1992).
247. Id. at 540.
248. Shatz et al., supra note I, at 31.
249. Id. (quoting T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342).
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matter) that strip searches are extremely invasive. The Seventh Circuit
in Doe v. Renfrow, for example, called a strip search of a
thirteen-year-old student "a violation of any known principle of human
decency." 5' The Second Circuit called strip searches "highly intrusive
invasion[s]" of privacy.25" ' And the Ninth Circuit noted the "intrusive
handling" that strip searches entail.252 Ignoring or discounting the
seriousness of these invasions flatly disregards not only T.L.O.'s
requirement that interests be fairly balanced, but also the Constitution's
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. It is the children
who pay the price with their individual dignity.
The second way in which students are damaged by the present
conception of their rights in the strip search context is in the
psychological harm they suffer when subjected to invasive searches.
Although adults are affected by strip searches as well, children are
especially susceptible to psychological harm. "Evidence from
psychologists supports the assumption that any search of a school age
child or adolescent has a greater impact than would such a search of an
adult because the development of a sense of privacy is critical to a child's
maturation." '253 Threats to children's privacy are essentially threats to
their self-esteem; intrusions as severe as strip searches may be both
emotionally and sexually traumatic, to the point that children may
experience strip searches as sexual abuse. Moreover, if strip searches are
experienced as sexual abuse, the fact that they are usually single events
does not diminish their impact on the child, since "[s]tudies have shown
that the duration and repetition of child sexual abuse are unrelated to its
traumatic effect. 254  In fact, the factors that are related to traumatic
effect in sexual abuse cases are "the use of force or coercion by the
abuser" and "a substantial age difference between the abuser and the
victim"--two factors almost always present in school strip search
situations.255
Although anyone would find strip searches intrusive and degrading,
the fact that children are not sufficiently protected against them is
particularly dangerous because they are the group most likely to suffer
250. Renfrow, 631 F.2d 91, 93 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1022 (1981).
251. M.M. v. Anker, 607 F.2d 588, 589 (2d Cir. 1979).
252. Bilbrey v. Brown, 738 F.2d 1462, 1468 (9th Cir. 1984).
253. Shatz et al., supra note 1, at 11. Even the Supreme Court has recognized that "[y]outh is
more than a chronological fact. It is a time and condition of life when a person may be most
susceptible to influence and psychological damage." Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115
(1982).
254. Shatz et al., supra note 1, at 13.
255. Id.
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actual psychological harm. Yet courts have almost uniformly failed to
consider these data. "[O]nly once has a [Supreme Court] Justice
supported his analysis of children's constitutional rights by reference to
the psychological literature on child development,. 256  and among strip
search cases, only in Cornfield has there been any real analysis of
psychological studies.2"
Finally, the strip search standard as currently applied fails to
recognize that "'[flor good or for ill,' ".[o]ur [g]ovemment is the potent,
the omnipresent teacher [and] teaches the whole people by its
example.""'25 The Supreme Court held as early as 1954 that education
"is perhaps the most important function" of government,259 and there
is no doubt that our experience in school gives content to many of our
fundamental values. If there is anywhere that constitutional protections
are to be jealously guarded, then, it should be in the schoolhouse. As
Justice Stevens recognized in T.L.O.,
The schoolroom is the first opportunity most citizens have to
experience the power of government. Through it passes every citizen
and public official, from schoolteachers to policemen and prison
guards. The values they learn there, they take with them in life. One
of our most cherished ideals is the one contained in the Fourth
Amendment: that the government may not intrude on the personal
privacy of its citizens without a warrant or compelling circumstance.
The Court's decision today is a curious moral for the Nation's
youth.26o
Similarly, Justice Brennan pointed out in his dissent from the denial of
certiorari in Doe v. Renfrow that
We do not know what class petitioner was attending when the
police and dogs burst in, but the lesson the school authorities taught
her that day will undoubtedly make a greater impression than the one
256. Id. at 10 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 245 n.3 (1972) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting)).
257. Cornfield v. Consolidated High Sch. Dist. No. 230, 991 F.2d 1316, 1321, 1323 (7th Cir.
1993).
258. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 373 (1985) (Stevens, Marshall, and Brennan, JJ.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485
(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). The entire passage reads as follows: "Our Government is the
potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime
is contagious. If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every
man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy." Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 485 (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
259. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
260. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 385-86 (Stevens, Marshall, and Brennan, JJ., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
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her teacher had hoped to convey. I would grant certiorari to teach
petitioner and her teacher another lesson: that the Fourth Amendment
protects "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures" . . . . Schools cannot expect their students to learn the
lessons of good citizenship when the school authorities themselves
disregard the fundamental principles underpinning our constitutional
freedoms.26
This point is even more compelling when one considers the many
children today whose families cannot provide the moral backdrop of right
and wrong. The school is the only model of order and regularity that
they know, and for it to breach constitutional barriers betrays their faith
and trust in their government and the Constitution underlying it to the
detriment of us all.
To add insult to injury, in addition to being victims of TL.O.'s
misapplication in the strip search context, students who are searched
under present law may be barred from recovering in a section 1983 suit
because their rights are simply not clearly established. Even those found
to prevail on the merits may still lose their relief to the immunity and
standing doctrines. In sum, the current application of the T.L.O. standard
to student strip searches is both too lenient and too ill-defined to protect
the interests of schoolchildren.
B. The Solution: A Stricter Standard for Strip Searches
Perhaps the best way to alleviate the problems identified in section
A would be to raise the general Fourth Amendment standard set forth in
T.L.O. and require school officials to abide by stricter guidelines in all
their searches. But the Court's opinion in TL.O. itself rejects such an
approach as too restrictive of school officials' discretion.262 Only three
of the Justices favored tighter controls.263 In fact, the TL.O. majority
and Justices Powell and Blackmun all emphasized that the states needed
261. Doe v. Renfrow, 451 U.S. 1022, 1027-28 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari). In his T.L.O. opinion, Justice Stevens quoted Brennan's language from Renfrow. 469
U.S. at 374 n.9 (Stevens, Marshall, and Brennan, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
262. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 339-43 (emphasizing the need for flexibility in overseeing the school
environment and defending its standard as one that "will spare teachers and school administrators the
necessity of schooling themselves in the niceties of probable cause and permit them to regulate their
conduct according to the dictates of reason and common sense"). Id. at 343.
263. Id. at 353-70 (Brennan and Marshall, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id at
370-86 (Stevens, Marshall, and Brennan, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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considerable leeway in running their schools and that any stricter standard
might compromise their ability to perform their essential duties.264
Instead of changing the entire Fourth Amendment framework for
school searches, this Article proposes that courts adopt a stricter standard
for strip searches only. No one questions that T.L.O. establishes a
sliding-scale test under which greater intrusions are subject to greater
restrictions. Since the courts have uniformly held that strip searches
"entail[] perhaps the most severe intrusion upon personal rights,, 265 it
makes sense that they should also be subject to the most comprehensive
restrictions. The basic T.L.O. framework, which suffices as a general
standard, could be left intact if only the specific area of strip searches
could be more closely controlled.
The opinions in T.L.O. itself provide two possible solutions. Justice
Brennan advocated using a probable cause standard for all "full-scale
intrusions upon privacy interests" 266-- that is, searches of one's person
like the one that took place in T.L.O.2 67 He would have held the search
unconstitutional on the basis that Choplick did not have probable cause
to "rummage through T.L.O.'s purse" once the initial search for cigarettes
was complete.268
Justice Stevens took an even less permissive view of school searches.
He argued that the Court's standard, which gave school officials the
power to search "when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that
the search will turn up evidence that the student has violated or is
violating either the law or the rules of the school, ' 269 was too lenient.
Instead, he recommended "a standard that varies the extent of the
permissible intrusion with the gravity of the suspected offense."27
Teachers and school administrators may search a student "when they have
reason to believe that the search will uncover evidence that the student
264. Id. at 343; TL.O., 469 U.S. at 350 (Powell and O'Connor, JJ., concurring); id. at 353
(Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment).
265. Flores v. Meese, 681 F. Supp. 665, 667 (C.D. Cal. 1988), aff'd, 942 F.2d 1352 (9th ir.
1991), rev'd on unrelated grounds sub nom. Reno v. Flores, 113 S. Ct. 1439 (1993). See also
Chapman v. Nichols, 989 F.2d 393, 395 (10th Cir. 1993) ("There can be no doubt that a strip search
is an invasion of personal rights of the first magnitude. It is axiomatic that a strip search represents
a serious intrusion upon personal rights.").
266. TL.O., 469 U.S. at 360 (Brennan and Marshall, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
267. Id. at 368 (Brennan and Marshall, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (asserting
that "school searches like that conducted in this case are valid only if supported by probable cause").
268. Id. (Brennan and Marshall, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
269. Id. at 342 (majority opinion).
270. Id. at 378-79 (Stevens, Marshall, and Brennan, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
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is violating the law or engaging in conduct that is seriously disruptive of
school order, or the educational process."27' Stevens would have held
that the search of T.L.O.'s purse was unreasonable at its inception
because it was initiated to uncover evidence of a violation of a minor
school rule. Since Choplick had "absolutely no basis" "to believe
T.L.O.'s purse contained any evidence of criminal activity, or of an
activity that would seriously disrupt school discipline," his actions were
unjustified.272
Both Stevens's and Brennan's opinions make sense (indeed, they are
quite convincing) in light of the Court's objective in T.L.O., whether one
sees that objective as establishing a general standard for searches in the
public schools or evaluating the particular search before it. But both
Justices' opinions are inadequate to address the strip search context,
perhaps because strip searches are an extreme subset of the set of all
school searches or because a strip search was not at issue in T.L.O.
Justice Brennan would raise the standard for initiating a search to
probable cause rather than reasonable suspicion, but seemed to place no
limits on the extent of the search once it is under way. Justice Stevens,
on the other hand, had the right idea when he noted that "[o]ne thing is
clear under any standard-the shocking strip searches that are described
in some cases have no place in the schoolhouse" '273 but failed to
incorporate the idea when formulating a standard. His standard, while
perfectly satisfactory for school searches in general, is simply too
amorphous to govern strip searches. It would permit school
administrators to justify strip searches for such things as theft-a crime
but not a threat to school order. And more importantly, it would allow
them to search based on any conduct that they deemed "seriously
disruptive of the school order"274 -an overly permissive bow to the
officials' discretion.
Nonetheless, elements of both Brennan's and Stevens's opinions can
be used to generate a new standard for strip searches. First, strip searches
should be conducted only when school officials can demonstrate that they
have probable cause to believe that a violation has occurred. As noted
above, 275 even the majority in T.L.O. recognized the need for a flexible,
271. Id. at 378 (Stevens, Marshall, and Brennan, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
272. Id. at 384 (Stevens, Marshall, and Brennan, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
273. Id. at 382 n.25 (Stevens, Marshall, and Brennan, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
274. Id. at 378 (Stevens, Marshall, and Brennan, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(emphasis removed).
275. See supra notes 219-31 and accompanying text. Recall also that several of the pre-T.L.O.
cases suggested that probable cause should be required in the school setting, see supra notes 189-95
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sliding scale standard for evaluating the reasonableness of a search.
Since strip searches are so much more intrusive than other searches, they
should be upheld only where the officials' suspicions rise to the level of
probable cause. (Of course, this means that individualized suspicion will
also be necessary.)
Second, strip searches should be used only to discover the most
serious violations. Again, this requirement stems from the fundamental
principle that the search must be commensurate with the objective that
motivates it. Strip searches should not be used to uncover evidence of
smoking violations or petty theft, but should be reserved for the major
problems in schools: weapons and drugs. Indeed, many courts deciding
school search cases have looked into the school's history to determine
how serious the problem is;2 6 this is a good way to avoid, for example,
strip-searching a student for drugs when the suspected drug use might be
merely an isolated incident at the school.
Third, strip searches are appropriate only where the violations are
likely to result in an immediate disruption of school order-the kind of
infraction that threatens the safety or health of other students. As with
the other limitations, this requirement insures that officials will perform
strip searches only in the most serious situations.
In addition to these three special requirements for strip searches,
courts should continue to abide by the reasonableness standard set out in
T.L.O., which requires that all searches be reasonable in light of the
objectives of the search "and not excessively intrusive in light of the age
and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction."2" Although
the student's sex has generally been given due consideration by requiring
that searches be performed by officials of the same sex, the age factor
had been ignored until Cornfield. Courts should follow the Seventh
Circuit's lead in being attentive to age as well as sex considerations.
In sum, strip searches must meet not only the general Fourth
Amendment requirements of T.L.O., but also the probable cause,
and accompanying text, and that Justice Stevens asserted that "the shocking strip searches that are
described in some cases have no place in the schoolhouse." T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 382 n.25 (Stevens,
Marshall, and Brennan, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
276. E.g., Bellnier v. Lund, 438 F. Supp. 47, 53 (N.D.N.Y. 1977) (listing as one of four "factors
which warrant consideration" in evaluating a search "the seriousness and prevalence of the problem
to which the search is directed"); Burnham v. West, 681 F. Supp. 1160, 1166 (E.D. Va. 1987)
(criticizing school officials who conducted searches for drugs without any evidence of their
prevalence at the particular school).
277. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342.
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seriousness, and "imminent threat to safety or health" tests set out above.
Only then will schoolchildren's rights be adequately protected.2 7
C. Application
In order to flesh out the standard proposed above, this section
applies it to a number of hypothetical situations, using it in each situation
to determine whether the strip search contemplated would be
constitutional. In each, imagine that you are a male school official
charged with deciding whether or not a strip search is appropriate.
1. Example A.-The Sanford High School has a history of violence.
Students have been known to bring guns to school, and several have been
injured in fights on or near the school premises. The suspected student,
a seventeen-year-old named John Joseph, has participated in at least two
fights in the last few months. Other students have reported on a number
of occasions that he owns and carries a gun. Today two students whom
you trust have told you that Joseph has his gun in school and has
threatened to shoot a classmate during recess. You pass Joseph in the
hall just before recess and notice an unnatural bulge in his pants about the
size of a handgun. You ask Joseph what he is doing in the hall and he
looks nervously at the floor and tells you he is going to the bathroom.
Further questioning gets you nowhere. Can you strip search Joseph?
In this example, a strip search is appropriate. Both Sanford School
and Joseph have a history of violence, and you have several reliable
reports that implicate Joseph in past violence and suggest that he may be
carrying a weapon today. Moreover, you observe that he has an unusual
bulge in his pants and that he is acting nervous. All these facts give you
probable cause. The potential harm is certainly serious enough to justify
a strip search-Joseph has threatened to shoot another student. And there
is an imminent threat to the safety or health of the school's students.
Moreover, you and Joseph are of the same sex, and he is old enough that
he should not suffer too much from the search.
2. Example B.-Martha Thomas, a sixteen-year-old student at Green
Leaf High School, was just brought to you after a teacher saw her
remove a small plastic bag from a larger bag and hand the small bag to
another student, George Jamison, in exchange for a twenty-dollar bill.
278. Note that the standard proposed here will not do much to help students past the municipal
immunity and standing hurdles, which are beyond the scope of this Article's Fourth Amendment
focus. These obstacles are not as easily removed, since they are a part of the Supreme Court's
overall section 1983 jurisprudence.
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The teacher did not see the contents of either bag, but believes that
Thomas has the larger one on her person. Her locker and desk have
already been searched, but nothing was found. As in Example A, your
school is not a pristine environment for learning. But at Green Leaf
drugs are the main problem, not violence. Students have reported that
Thomas is one of the main dealers of drugs at the school and does a
steady business selling marijuana and "magic mushrooms." They also
report that she smokes marijuana regularly. When you approach Thomas
to question her, she smells of marijuana. Your questioning generates
only denials of any wrongdoing." 9 Can you strip search Thomas?
Again, a strip search would be permissible under -these
circumstances. Thomas is reputed to be a large-scale drug dealer, she
was observed conducting what appeared to be a drug deal, and she smells
of drugs. Drugs are a major problem at your school and possessing and
selling marijuana and "magic mushrooms" are crimes. And drugs, as the
Supreme Court acknowledged in T.L.O.,2 0 are one of the most serious
problems facing schools, since they are so disruptive to the learning
environment. Since the situation you face meets the probable cause,
seriousness, and "imminent threat to safety or health" requirements, a
strip search is acceptable. But you must still comply with the basic
reasonableness mandate of T.L.O., so you cannot perform the search
yourself; you must have a woman do it.
3. Example C.-You are in charge of the Taylor High School. Last
week a student reported that two of her classmates, Betty Roberts and
Rebecca Allen, were sniffing glue in class. Today you received another
report of this behavior from the same informant. You also know that
Roberts' father suspects she might be using drugs and that Allen typed
something in class a few months ago mentioning parties at which drugs
were used. You call the two girls, both fifteen, to your office and ask for
an explanation. Roberts produces a tube of glue, which is legal to
possess but not to sniff. You have Allen's locker, purse, and bookbag
searched, but nothing turns up.28' Is a strip search of Allen acceptable?
A strip search would not be appropriate here. Drugs are a serious
problem, but there is no evidence that your school is beseiged by them
or that these girls were dealing drugs. Moreover, the glue you would be
279. This example is loosely based on the recent case of Cornfield v. Consolidated High Sch.
Dist. No. 230, 991 F.2d 1316 (7th Cir. 1993). The Seventh Circuit in Cornfield upheld the search.
280. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 339 ("drug use and violent crime in the schools have become major
social problems").
281. This example is loosely based on the recent case of Williams v. Ellington, 936 F.2d 881
(6th Cir. 1991). The Sixth Circuit in Ellington upheld the search.
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looking for is not itself illegal (as marijuana or crack would be) but
would at best be circumstantial evidence that the girls were sniffing it.
And even if they were, sniffing glue does not pose a significant threat to
other students. In other words, the seriousness and "imminent threat to
safety or health" requirements are not met. Most importantly, though,
you lack probable cause to strip search Allen. You have already
uncovered a tube of glue that matches the informant's description, and
inspections of Allen's locker and belongings have yielded nothing that
justifies a further intrusion, especially one as invasive as a strip search.
So you must stop your inquiry here.
4. Example D.-Next, assume that you are an administrator at the
McLean Middle School. Joe Rubin, a fourteen-year-old student, is
suspected of stealing twenty dollars from fellow student Bill Taylor's
locker. Taylor reported the money missing after he returned to his locker
at 11:00 a.m. and found that money he had left there before his 10:15
class was gone. Rubin was caught stealing small items twice last year.
He was not the only student in the hallway where the locker is located
between 10:15 and 11:00, but other students observed him standing in
front of Taylor's open locker at 10:30. You summon Rubin and ask him
about the money. He denies taking anything. Searches of his locker
produce nothing incriminating. Can you strip search him?
A strip search is not appropriate here. As in Mark Anthony B. ,282
there is reason to suspect and question Rubin. He has stolen in the past
and several students saw him at the scene of the crime. In other words,
the probable cause requirement is met. But the seriousness and
"imminent threat to safety or health" elements are missing; theft is not
something schools should condone, but neither does it pose a serious
threat to classroom order or to the safety of other students the way drugs
and violence do.
5. Example E.-Finally, assume that you work at the Thompson
Elementary School. You have long suspected, based on reports from
teachers and bus drivers, that Tom Gannon, age seven, is a courier for
some high school drug dealers. This morning before classes, a teacher
saw Gannon take several small vials from an older boy outside the school
building. Ten minutes later, the teacher watched as Gannon walked
across the street, handed one of the vials to a second older boy, and
received some cash. Gannon then entered the school building, where the
282. State v. Mark Anthony B., 433 S.E.2d 41 (W. Va. 1993). A full discussion of this case is
found supra accompanying notes 221-26.
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teacher called him over and escorted him to your office. You question
Gannon about drugs, but he admits no wrongdoing. Can you strip search
him to look for the remaining vials?
Again, you cannot. The situation meets all three additional tests
proposed in this Article-probable cause, a serious offense, and an
imminent threat to the safety or health of the student body-but it does
not meet the "reasonable in light of the student's age" requirement of
T.L.O. itself. Gannon may be engaging in criminal activity, but at age
seven he is hardly capable of criminal intent and is less able than an older
student would be to consent to a strip search. Moreover, he is likely to
be vulnerable to psychological harm should you perform such an invasive
search. You will have to combat drug dealing in another way.
The above illustrations reveal that the standard proposed in this
Article, which would require strip searches to meet not only the general
T.L. 0. reasonableness standard but also probable cause, seriousness, and
"imminent threat to safety or health" tests, is significantly more protective
of students' rights than the current standard. The T.L. 0. standard permits
courts considerable discretion in determining the reasonableness of each
search. Although the exercise of this discretion often yields good
decisions, as in Mark Anthony B., it does not require them. In contrast,
the proposed standard forces courts to recognize both the individual
dignity of schoolchildren and the role that schools play in inculcating
each generation with our shared values. And the proposed standard sets
out the constitutional requirements more carefully than courts have done
under TL.O., thereby making students' rights much more meaningful by
helping them overcome the immunity hurdle.
VI. Conclusion
That [boards of education] are educating the young for citizenship is
reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the
individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at its source and
teach youth to discount important principles of our government as
mere platitudes." 3
It is clear from the case law on strip searches that while New Jersey
v. T.L. 0. provided courts with a framework for decisionmaking, there is
still considerable confusion over what exactly is "reasonable" in student
strip search cases. And indeed T.L.O. may have encouraged further
troubles, since it sought to provide breathing room for teachers and
283. West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).
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school officials: "By focusing attention on the question of
reasonableness, the standard [set forth herein] will spare teachers and
school administrators the necessities of schooling themselves in the
niceties of probable cause and permit them to regulate their conduct
according to the dictates of reason and common sense." 8' Maintaining
that kind of breathing room does not make sense where highly intrusive
invasions of privacy, like strip searches, are concerned. Courts have
room to make the right decisions, but they also have room in which to
err. Students deserve greater protection for their constitutional rights to
privacy and greater respect for their individual dignity than TL.O.
provides. The problem is only exacerbated by the Court's recent
construction of section 1983.
Still, if T.L.O. exacerbates the problem, it also contains the roots of
a solution. Its flexible approach, which places restrictions on searches
according to the extent of the intrusion they entail, allows courts leeway
to uphold a higher-than-usual standard for student strip search cases.
Such a standard, which would require that such searches be conducted
only on probable cause and only to prevent serious and imminent harm,
would go far toward protecting the privacy and dignity of students whose
constitutional rights are now in question. Moreover, it would force
schools to obey the dictates of the system whose next generation they are
charged with educating.
284. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 343.

